Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court

2001 ◽  
pp. 79-87
Reified Life ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 148-174
Author(s):  
J. Paul Narkunas

This chapter describes how English and French as the de jure languages of human rights at the International Criminal Court. As a result, populations who do not adhere to Western Enlightenment notions of rights can be declared terrorists or “enemies of humankind.” By tracing the workings of translation in the ICC through the Thomas Lubanga trial, the author discusses how translation can deny human status to those brought before the ICC. It also provides, however, the means to challenge the legitimacy of the court as merely another sign of universalizing western justice, solidified by the fact that all people brought before the ICC come from the continent of Africa. By focusing on how language produces reality, the creation of natural rights claims allow for new forms of political protection in the chasm between differing legal orders. Consequently, thinking the role of translation as metaphor and practice for world making and the production of agency is an inchoate form of political aesthetics. Translation may offer, thus, a way to reconceive the human and its attendant rights due to language’s role in world making, subject production, and power relations. This indicates a form of ahuman agency.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilia Justyna Powell ◽  
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

International courts have proliferated in the international system in the past century, with one hundred judicial or quasi-judicial bodies currently in existence. While the supply of international courts has increased substantially, state level support for international courts varies across states, across courts, and over time. This paper focuses on the cross-sectional and temporal variation in state level support for a particular court, the International Criminal Court (ICC). The authors argue that domestic legal systems create different predispositions with respect to states’ willingness to join adjudicatory bodies and the design of their commitments to international courts. Negotiators involved in the creation of the ICC pushed for rules and procedures that mimicked those of their domestic legal systems to help reduce uncertainty regarding the court’s future behavior and decision-making processes. This interesting process of legal bargaining led to the creation of a sui generis court, one which represents a mixture of common law and civil law systems. The hybrid nature of the court’s design enhanced the attractiveness of the court to civil and common law states, making them significantly more likely to sign and ratify the Rome Statute. Empirical models demonstrate that common and civil law states were fervent supporters of the ICC in preliminary negotiations and that they have shown higher levels of support for the Court since the ICC’s inception in comparison to Islamic law or mixed law states.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUDITH KELLEY

What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly normative, and international commitments do not just screen states; they also constrain.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshiaki Kitano

This paper aims to discuss the legal basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court while viewing the topic as one of the issues demonstrating the current status of general international law concerning the creation of obligations for non-party states. The table of contents included in this part 4 is as follows: Chapter 3 Examination of the Preparatory Work of the Statute (Section 1 Outline of the Preparatory Work of the Statute (1. Work prior to the Rome Conference / 2. Work at the Rome Conference, in particular on the State-Consent Requirements for the Proposed ICC’s Exercise of Jurisdiction) / Section 2 Analysis of the Relevant Discussions Conducted in the Preparatory Work of the Statute (1. Discussions over the Rules of the Law of Treaties on the Creation of Obligations for Non-Party States)).


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 57 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 57 sets out the functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Article 39 of the Rome Statute established the existence of the Pre-Trial Chamber. It required the creation of a Pre-Trial Division of not less than six judges, and was to be composed predominantly of judges with criminal trial experience. The Pre-Trial Chamber is ‘responsible for any matter, request or information arising out of the situation assigned to it’, subject to the authority of the President of the Pre-Trial Division to assign a matter, request, or information to another Pre-Trial Chamber ‘in the interests of the administration of justice’.


2009 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 3-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Moreno-Ocampo

AbstractI took office seven years ago as the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Over those years, I have seen remarkable developments, the creation of a global judicial institution from scratch, the development of our operations in all regions of the world, mainly in conflict areas, the setting up of key jurisprudence on modes of liability, complementarity, criminal procedure as well as on victims' participation before the Court. Today I would like to focus on how the work of this Court can contribute to the prevention of massive crimes. Crimes we thought, over and over, would never happen again, only to see them occur, again and again, before our eyes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. How can we maximize the preventive impact of our work? How can we ensure that the crimes committed in Georgia during the summer of 2008, in Guinea in the fall of 2009 are not repeated? How can we stop current crimes in Darfur? How can we prevent a new cycle of violence during the next elections in Kenya scheduled for 2012? How can we support Colombia's efforts to end half a century of violence?


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Mills ◽  
Alan Bloomfield

AbstractThe creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 marked a substantial advance in the effort to ensure all perpetrators of mass atrocities can be brought to justice. Yet significant resistance to the anti-impunity norm, and the ICC as the implementing institution, has arisen in Africa. The ICC has primarily operated in Africa, and since it sought to indict the sitting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2008 resistance from both individual African states and the African Union has increased substantially. We draw on the concept of ‘norm antipreneurs’, and the broader norm dynamics literature, to analyse how resistance has developed and manifested itself, as well as the potential effects of this resistance on the anti-impunity norm. We conclude that the antipreneur concept helped us structure and organise analysis of the case – suggesting it could be usefully deployed in other similar cases – but that this case also suggests that antipreneurs do not always enjoy substantial defensive advantages. We also conclude that African resistance to the ICC has substantially stalled the advance of the anti-impunity norm, a finding that has significant implications for the wider effort to reduce mass atrocity crimes in the contemporary era.


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