Notes on Aggregation Criteria in Market Segmentation

1984 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-335
Author(s):  
William Blozan ◽  
Paul Prabhaker

First, the authors seek to dispel any misunderstanding that standard price discrimination theory prescribes a profit-maximizing aggregation criterion. They argue that Tollefson and Lessig misinterpreted this theory, but prove that the latter authors’ unwarranted implication is justified in the case of linear demand functions and constant marginal costs. Second, the authors argue that the “theoretical evidence” presented by Tollefson and Lessig against using elasticities to cluster segments is, in fact, no evidence at all, and that their simulations may be valid only under extreme conditions. Finally, a new theorem is offered which provides some support for using clustering techniques to disaggregate markets.

2014 ◽  
Vol 912-914 ◽  
pp. 1865-1873
Author(s):  
Xing You Gao

Equilibrium production, equilibrium price and equilibrium total revenue in the case of implementing third-degree price discrimination and unified pricing were analyzed under the condition of two oligopoly firms with 2 sub markets by complete information static game method, and the relationship between the three indexes of the two cases were studied. The results showed that, under the condition of linear demand functions of the two sub markets, the equilibrium output of unified pricing was equal to the equilibrium output of discriminative pricing; the equilibrium price of unified pricing was weighted average of the equilibrium prices of two sub markets while discriminative pricing; the equilibrium total revenue of unified pricing was less than the equilibrium total revenue of discriminative pricing.


2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Flores ◽  
Vitaliy Kalashnikov

1981 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 310-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phipps Arabie ◽  
J. Douglas Carroll ◽  
Wayne DeSarbo ◽  
Jerry Wind

Most clustering techniques used in product positioning and market segmentation studies render mutually exclusive equivalence classes of the relevant products or subjects space. Such classificatory techniques are thus restricted to the extent that they preclude overlap between subsets or equivalence classes. An overlapping clustering model, ADCLUS, is described which can be used in marketing studies involving products/subjects that can belong to more than one group or cluster simultaneously. The authors provide theoretical justification for and an application of the approach, using the MAPCLUS algorithm for fitting the ADCLUS model.


2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Hornbeck

AbstractPatent-holding pharmaceutical companies are shown to be imperfectly able to charge differential prices for AIDS drugs due to the potential for black market exchange. Thus, greater segmentation in the international market through additional barriers to smuggling would induce firms to charge lower prices for AIDS drugs in poorer countries. Without these additional barriers, widespread drug distribution through mandated lower prices or weakened patent protection in the developing world would result in smuggling, undercutting demand in developed markets and reducing firms’ research incentives. By contrast, further market segmentation would allow policy makers to go beyond the induced price cuts and remove patent protection in many markets where the benefits to increased distribution would likely outweigh the losses to research incentives.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 123-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillermo Marshall

This paper studies a market where soda is sold in both refillable and nonrefillable bottles. Purchasing refillables is inconvenient but cheaper. Using a discrete choice model, I find that price-sensitive customers put less weight on the inconveniences of purchasing refillables. This implies that a retailer can target lower prices to price-sensitive customers using the refillable segment. I evaluate the overall welfare consequences of this market segmentation and find that both customer welfare and profits would decrease (by 12.61 and 4.21 percent, respectively) if the refillables were removed, as there would be an important market-shrinkage effect. (JEL D22, L13, L25, L81)


1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
RABAH AMIR ◽  
ISABEL GRILO ◽  
JIM JIN

This paper provides general conditions on the direct demand functions in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated substitute products and constant marginal costs, that allow an unambiguous ranking of firms' equilibrium payoffs between sequential play (with both order of moves) on the one hand, and simultaneous play on the other. The main results are that (i) when prices are strategic complements, both firms prefer sequential moves (with either order) to simultaneous moves, (ii) when prices are strategic substitutes, both firms prefer simultaneous moves to moving second in sequential play, and (iii) in the mixed strategic substitute/complement case, one firm is as in (i) and the other as in (ii). Thus, sequential moves would plausibly endogenously emerge in cases (i) and (iii), with one specified leader in the latter case. The analysis relies crucially on the theory of supermodular games, and is conducted at a high level of generality, dispensing with concavity-type assumptions, and taking into account both the issues of existence and possible non-uniqueness of the different equilibria involved.


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