Research on C2C e-commerce taxation based on mixed decision game

The rapid rise of C2C e-commerce in China has brought serious difficulties to China's tax collection and management. Based on the principle of progressive taxation, the necessity of Taxation on C2C e-commerce is analyzed and discussed. It is shown that the absence of Taxation in C2C e-commerce is contrary to the principle of tax equity and tax neutrality, and the tax revenue is lost.It is demonstrated that it is imperative that China to implement C2C e-commerce taxation in a comprehensive and standardized way. By constructing a hybrid decision game model between C2C business operators and tax authorities, the static game analysis of incomplete information is conducted for the balance of interests between tax authorities and e-commerce operators.

Research on C2C E-Commerce Taxation Based on Mixed Decision Game

The rapid rise of C2C e-commerce in China has brought serious difficulties to China's tax collection and management. Based on the principle of progressive taxation, the necessity of Taxation on C2C e-commerce is analyzed and discussed. It is shown that the absence of Taxation in C2C e-commerce is contrary to the principle of tax equity and tax neutrality, and the tax revenue is lost.It is demonstrated that it is imperative that China to implement C2C e-commerce taxation in a comprehensive and standardized way. By constructing a hybrid decision game model between C2C business operators and tax authorities, the static game analysis of incomplete information is conducted for the balance of interests between tax authorities and e-commerce operators.

Optimal pricing and complex analysis with carbon emission reduction preference in an apparel supply chain

In this paper, we study the supply chain competition models that consider consumers' low-carbon consumption preferences. By constructing the supply chain of manufacturers and retailers with different market positions, two game types, decentralized decision making and centralized decision making are proposed, and the static and dynamic game methods are combined respectively for research. Although research has found that centralized decision making is always better than decentralized decision making under the static game mode, when considering the long-term dynamic evolutionary game, the average profit of decentralized decision making may be better than the average profit of centralized decision making. Moreover, there are complex dynamic characteristics under dynamic games. In order to fully understand the nature of the dynamic game systems, we discussed the stability, local bifurcation, and global bifurcation of these dynamic systems. It is found that although dynamic game systems may lose stability with changes in parameters, they are better than static game results in some cases, this is beneficial to decision-makers and has practical management significance.

On the Existence and Determining Stationary Nash Equilibria for Switching Controller Stochastic Games

In this paper we consider the problem of the existence and determining stationary Nash equilibria for switching controller stochastic games with discounted and average payoffs. The set of states and the set of actions in the considered games are assumed to be finite. For a switching controller stochastic game with discounted payoffs we show that all stationary equilibria can be found by using an auxiliary continuous noncooperative static game in normal form in which the payoffs are quasi-monotonic (quasi-convex and quasi-concave) with respect to the corresponding strategies of the players. Based on this we propose an approach for determining the optimal stationary strategies of the players. In the case of average payoffs for a switching controller stochastic game we also formulate an auxiliary noncooperative static game in normal form with quasi-monotonic payoffs and show that such a game possesses a Nash equilibrium if the corresponding switching controller stochastic game has a stationary Nash equilibrium.

Research on Ecological Compensation in the Yellow River Basin Based on the Perspective of Game Theory

The Yellow River Basin is an important ecological function zone in China, and it plays an important role in the national economic and social development pattern. However, the over-utilization of water resources has made the ecological and environmental problems in the river basin more and more serious. For this reason, the coordinated governance of the areas along the Yellow River basin has become very important. Based on the static game model, this paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the coordinated governance of the Yellow River basin in the upstream and downstream areas, constructs a static game model of ecological compensation between the Shanxi and Henan governments under coordinated governance, and studies the feedback equilibrium strategies of the Shanxi and Henan governments. This article provides theoretical basis and suggestions for collaborative governance to achieve sustainable development. The game results show that: reducing the cost of protecting the ecological environment of the upstream basin, increasing the benefits of protecting the ecological environment, and increasing the amount of ecological compensation can promote the implementation of the ecological compensation policy between the upstream and downstream in the basin.

MIN-MAX SOLUTIONS FOR PARAMETRIC CONTINUOUS STATIC GAME UNDER ROUGHNESS (PARAMETERS IN THE COST FUNCTION AND FEASIBLE REGION IS A ROUGH SET)

Any simple perturbation in a part of the game whether in the cost function and/or conditions is a big problem because it will require a game re-solution to obtain the perturbed optimal solution. This is a waste of time because there are methods required several steps to obtain the optimal solution, then at the end we may find that there is no solution. Therefore, it was necessary to find a method to ensure that the game optimal solution exists in the case of a change in the game data. This is the aim of this paper. We first provided a continuous static game rough treatment with Min-Max solutions, then a parametric study for the processing game and called a parametric rough continuous static game (PRCSG). In a Parametric study, a solution approach is provided based on the parameter existence in the cost function that reflects the perturbation that may occur to it to determine the parameter range in which the optimal solution point keeps in the surely region that is called the stability set of the \(1^{st}\) kind. Also the sets of possible upper and lower stability to which the optimal solution belongs are characterized. Finally, numerical examples are given to clarify the solution algorithm.

Static Game Models and Applications Based on Market Supervision and Compliance Management of P2P Platform

This article focuses on the two-party static game between market supervisory organization and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform. Considering 4 game modes with both “strong supervision” and “weak supervision” of market supervisory organization and “compliance management” and “noncompliance management” of P2P lending platform, the paper establishes a static game model between P2P lending platform and market supervisory organization and solves the market equilibrium solutions. Based on income, cost, disguised cost, and fine of P2P lending platform and income, cost, and reward of market supervisory organization, it discusses conditional strategies that P2P lending platform selects “compliance management” or “noncompliance management” and that market supervisory organization selects “strong supervision” or “weak supervision,” respectively. Furthermore, the relevant influencing factors are analyzed which come from 18 P2P lending platforms in Guangdong Province of China, and the conclusions were in good agreement with the actual market. The research has scientific guiding significance.