Planning and the Liberal Paradox: A Democratic Dilemma in Social Choice

1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tore Sager
Politics ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Vanhuysse

In this article, Amartya Sen's seminal proof of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal is briefly reviewed. I then discuss the reception of this alleged ‘liberal paradox’ within the fields of political theory and welfare economics. In particular, I examine the criticisms made by Brian Barry, and their wider implications for the field of social choice theory. It is argued that the various criticisms made on Sen's characterisation of liberty are fundamental, and that Sen's subsequent defence of his position is unconvincing. Moreover, there remain some wider doubts as to the usefulness of social choice theory's SWF approach to individual rights and freedoms.


2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian List

Philip Pettit (2001) has suggested that there are parallels between his republican account of freedom and Amartya Sen's (1970) account of freedom as decisive preference. In this paper, I discuss these parallels from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. I sketch a formalization of republican freedom and argue that republican freedom is formally very similar to freedom as defined in Sen's “minimal liberalism” condition. In consequence, the republican account of freedom is vulnerable to a version of Sen's liberal paradox, an inconsistency between universal domain, freedom, and the weak Pareto principle. I argue that some standard escape routes from the liberal paradox – those via domain restriction – are not easily available to the republican. I suggest that republicans need to take seriously the challenge of the impossibility of a Paretian republican.


2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 518-522
Author(s):  
Mohammed H. I. Dore
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Vladimir I. Danilov ◽  
Alexander I. Sotskov
Keyword(s):  

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