Social Choice and Game Theory: Recent Result from a Topologic Approach

1981 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graciela Chichilnisky
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Recent Result

scholarly journals QUANTUM MECHANISM HELPS AGENTS COMBAT "BAD" SOCIAL CHOICE RULES

2011 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 615-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAOYANG WU
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Reverse Problem ◽  
Quantum Domain ◽  
Quantum Mechanism ◽  
Social Choice Rules ◽  
Quantum Strategies

Quantum strategies have been successfully applied to game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, the theory of mechanism design is generalized to a quantum domain. The main result is that by virtue of a quantum mechanism, agents who satisfy a certain condition can combat "bad" social choice rules instead of being restricted by the traditional mechanism design theory.

Game theory and social choice

1982 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-409
Author(s):  
Mamoru Kaneko ◽  
F.W. Roush
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice

SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340012 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATHIEU MARTIN ◽  
MAURICE SALLES
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Topological Structure ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
The Core ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Voting Games ◽  
Aggregation Functions ◽  
Positive Results

We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.

Liberal games: Further comments on social choice and game theory

Public Choice ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Aldrich
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice

The Heresthetics of Coup Making

1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
YOUSSEF COHEN
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Political Change ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Relationship

Heresthetics is a term coined by Riker to refer to the stratagems used by politicians to manipulate the structure of a decision-making situation. The object of such manipulation is to force one's opponents into a choice of alternatives such that, whichever alternative is chosen, the opponents will lose. The main argument of this article is that military coups and regimes are largely the outcomes of successful heresthetical maneuvers. In this article my argument is applied to the emergence of the Brazilian military regime of 1964. But the argument should apply more widely. At the very least, this preliminary exercise should stimulate more research on the strategic maneuvers that engender military regimes and other forms of political change. By investigating the relationship between heresthetics and regime change this article also shows how social choice theory and game theory can be used to complement and enrich current explanations of political change.

Social choice and the grammar of rights and freedoms

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Dowding
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Analytic Theory ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
History Of

The techniques of social choice and game theory are increasingly being used to analyse concepts in political theory. Although these techniques may prove invaluable for teasing out contradictory formulations, puzzles and problems with traditional concepts, formal writers often begin their analysis with simplistic intuitive accounts rather than building on earlier traditions in analytic political theory. This is particularly apparent in social-choice and game-theory analysis of rights and freedoms. This chapter reviews these approaches and demonstrates that by ignoring the grammar of rights and freedoms, social-choice and game-theory analysis goes wrong from the very beginning. Formal writers need to take more account of the history of their subject, as developed in the analytic theory tradition.

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