scholarly journals Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 503-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys ◽  
Gordon Pennycook

Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 701-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West

In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily integrated into our generic dual-process account. We further explicate how we view the relation between System 1 and System 2 and evolutionary and normative rationality. We clarify our attempt to fuse the contributions of the cognitive ecologists with the insights of the original heuristics and biases researchers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys

Abstract In this commentary, I highlight the relevance of Cushman's target article for the popular dual-process framework of thinking. I point to the problematic characterization of rationalization in traditional dual-process models and suggest that in line with recent advances, Cushman's rational rationalization account offers a way out of the rationalization paradox.


2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian M. Monroe ◽  
Bryan L. Koenig ◽  
Kum Seong Wan ◽  
Tei Laine ◽  
Swati Gupta ◽  
...  

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 460-460
Author(s):  
Reinout W. Wiers ◽  
Remco Havermans ◽  
Roland Deutsch ◽  
Alan W. Stacy

AbstractThe model of addiction proposed by Redish et al. shows a lack of fit with recent data and models in psychological studies of addiction. In these dual process models, relatively automatic appetitive processes are distinguished from explicit goal-directed expectancies and motives, whereas these are all grouped together in the planning system in the Redish et al. model. Implications are discussed.


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