Ultimatum Game Bargaining Behaviour: A Classroom Experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 232102222110244
Author(s):  
Metin Tetik ◽  
Gamzegül Tetik
Keyword(s):  
Classroom Environment ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Final Exam ◽  
Jel Codes ◽  
Classroom Experiment ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining Game ◽  
The Nash Solution

This study aims to investigate the types of bargaining behaviour students have and the variables that affect these bargaining behaviours by designing an ultimatum bargaining game in the classroom environment (during the real exam). The experimental group consists of 202 students who took the spring term economics final exam. The strategic interaction between students was formulated as a two-person bargaining problem. A cooperative solution was based on the Nash solution also obtained for bargaining problem among students. The findings of this study show that the highest bargaining equilibrium in this game is the equilibrium status based on the Nash solution. Moreover, we concluded that the success of the economy course and the grade-level affect the students’ behaviour according to the equilibrium strategy based on the Nash solution. JEL Codes: C90, C70, C78, C57

Bargaining and Justice

1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Nash Solution

My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.

SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR A TWO PERSON BARGAINING PROBLEM WITH UNKNOWN PARAMETERS

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 39-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
ACHEMINE FARIDA ◽  
MERAKEB ABDELKADER
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Unknown Parameters ◽  
Complete Ignorance ◽  
The Nash Solution

In this paper, we study a concept of solution for a bargaining problem involving two players and unknown parameters in the case of complete ignorance. The solution we propose is based on the Nash solution for a bargaining problem and the maxmin principle of Wald. We also give some properties of this solution and sufficient conditions for its existence. Finally, we propose an adequate procedure for its determination and an illustrative example.

The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem

2012 ◽  
pp. 30-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon C. Rausser ◽  
Jo Swinnen ◽  
Pinhas Zusman
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
The Nash Solution

A Sensitivity Based Approach to Determining Non-Cooperative Solutions in Nash and Stackelberg Games

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehsan Ghotbi ◽  
Wilkistar A. Otieno ◽  
Anoop K. Dhingra
Keyword(s):  
Response Surface Methodology ◽  
Computational Effort ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Numerical Errors ◽  
Multiobjective Problems ◽  
Cooperative Solutions ◽  
The One ◽  
Rational Reaction Set ◽  
The Nash Solution

A sensitivity based approach is presented to determine Nash solution(s) in multiobjective problems modeled as a non-cooperative game. The proposed approach provides an approximation to the rational reaction set (RRS) for each player. An intersection of these sets yields the Nash solution for the game. An alternate approach for generating the RRS based on design of experiments (DOE) combined with response surface methodology (RSM) is also explored. The two approaches for generating RRS are compared on three example problems to find Nash and Stackelberg solutions. It is seen that the proposed sensitivity based approach (i) requires less computational effort than a RSM-DOE approach, (ii) is less prone to numerical errors than the RSM-DOE approach, (iii) is able to find all Nash solutions when the Nash solution is not a singleton, (iv) is able to approximate non linear RRS, and (v) is able to find better a Nash solution on an example problem than the one reported in the literature.

scholarly journals The Nash Solution as a von Neumann–Morgenstern Utility Function on Bargaining Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 87-104
Author(s):  
Anke Gerber
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Bargaining Games ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
The Nash Solution

AbstractIn this paper we prove that the symmetric Nash solution is a risk neutral von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function on the class of pure bargaining games. Our result corrects an error in Roth (Econometrica 46:587–594, 983, 1978) and generalizes Roth’s result to bargaining games with arbitrary status quo.

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