Social value orientation moderates the effects of intuition versus reflection on responses to unfair ultimatum offers

We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of pondering at length or acting in a hasty way; then they made the plan to adopt an intuitive or a reflective mode of processing (intuitive and reflective condition, respectively), or made no such plans (control condition). Participants with rather high (prosocial) SVO scores were more likely to accept unfair offers in the reflective than the intuitive condition. This effect also evinced for a subset of selfish individuals; however, the majority with rather low (selfish) scores made similar decisions in both conditions. This pattern of results suggests that SVO moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective modes of processing on responses to low ultimatum offers.

Shall I Show My Emotions? The Effects of Facial Expressions in the Ultimatum Game

Over the past fifteen years, research has demonstrated the central role of interpersonal emotions in communicating intentions, goals and desires. These emotions can be conveyed through facial expressions during specific social interactions, such as in the context of coordination between economic agents, where information inferred from them can influence certain decision-making processes. We investigated whether four facial expressions (happiness, neutral, angry and disgusted) can affect decision-making in the Ultimatum Game (UG). In this economic game, one player (proposer) plays the first move and proposes how to allocate a given amount of money in an anonymous one-shot interaction. If the other player (responder) accepts the proposal, each player receives the allocated amount of money; if he/she rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. During the task, participants acted as the responder (Experiment 1) or the proposer (Experiment 2) while seeing the opponent’s facial expression. For the responders, the results show that the decision was mainly driven by the fairness of the offer, with a small main effect of emotion. No interaction effect was found between emotion and offer. For the proposers, the results show that participants modulated their offers on the basis of the responders’ expressed emotions. The most generous/fair offers were proposed to happy responders. Less generous/fair offers were proposed to neutral responders. Finally, the least generous/fair offers were proposed to angry and disgusted responders.

In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior

This study examines experimental evidence showing how ethics power allocation mechanisms affect an individual’s in-organization resource division and ethical behavior. We used two two-stage lab experiments to explore power seeking and usage; the experiments contained two stages of power contending and power usage. Stage one used two different power-seeking mechanisms in the honesty game. Stage two was based on the dictator game and the ultimatum game to measure an individual’s power usage. The results show that the decisions taken by power-holders could influence the optimization of collective resources, and power-holders who gain power with unethical methods could result in collective resource allocation inequities. With more balanced in-organization power, members tend to be more honest. Subjects also adjust their unethical behavior to adapt to the environment, which could cause the diffusion of unethical behavior. This paper re-designed the dictator game and the ultimatum game by adding an ethically vulnerable power acquisition mechanism. For organizations to prevent the disproportionate dispersion of resources and achieve more public benefits, it is meaningful for managers to create a proper in-organization ethical power allocation mechanism.

Interpersonal brain synchronization during face-to-face economic exchange between acquainted dyads

Interpersonal brain synchronization (IBS) has been observed during social interactions and involves various factors, such as familiarity with the partner and type of social activity. A previous study has shown that face-to-face interactions in pairs of strangers increase IBS. However, it is unclear whether this can be observed when the nature of the interacting partners is different. Herein, we aimed to extend these findings to pairs of acquaintances. Neural activity in the frontal and temporal regions was recorded using functional near-infrared spectroscopy hyperscanning. Participants played an ultimatum game that required virtual economic exchange in two experimental settings: the face-to-face and face-blocked conditions. Random pair analysis confirmed whether IBS was induced by social interaction. Contrary to the aforementioned study, our results did not show any cooperative behavior or task-induced IBS increase. Conversely, the random pair analysis results revealed that the pair-specific IBS was significant only in the task condition at the left and right superior frontal, middle frontal, orbital superior frontal, right superior temporal, precentral, and postcentral gyri. Our results revealed that face-to-face interaction in acquainted pairs did not increase IBS and supported the idea that IBS is affected by "with whom we interact and how."

Frustration elevates arousal in individuals high on the psychopathy scale: The role of approach, not avoidance motivation

Psychopaths tend to react with aggression when mistreated. The literature offers two contradicting explanations of this subject. The aim of this study is to determine whether approach or (the lack of) avoidance motivation underlie emotional reactions of individuals with elevated psychopathic tendencies in frustrative situations. The sample of sixty participants (43.3% male) participated in the experiment in which the Ultimatum Game was used to induce the feeling of injustice. The participants received four fair offers in the first phase of the game and six unfair offers in the second phase of the experiment. Their electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded during both parts of the experiment. Along with the EDA recording, the participants fulfilled Short Dark Triad (SD3) questionnaire and Questionnaire of Approach and Avoidance Motivation (QAAM). Generally, the unfair offers significantly elevated EDA in comparison to the levels of EDA during the fair part of the experiment. The mediational analysis conducted by hierarchical regression analysis revealed that psychopathy is associated with a higher EDA in frustrative conditions, which is entirely explained by QAAM wanting, i.e. approach-related scale. Neither of avoidance-related scales predicted the EDA. This result indicates that individuals with elevated psychopathic tendencies experience stronger emotional reactions when facing the potential loss of rewards, which is driven by their stronger approach motivation, and not by the lack of avoidance motivation. Hence, the study contributes to the understanding of the underlying reason for emotional reactions of individuals with elevated psychopathic tendencies in unfair conditions within the approach-avoidance framework. Implications for the methodological setting of future studies on this subject are discussed.

The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game

We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian Cabinet and the yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical (rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the receiver is satisfied with any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction in the receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe this behavior in the emotional behavior of frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the leaders of the yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime minister nikola Pašić who opposed any concessions to the yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces two conclusions. first, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.