scholarly journals Entry, Exit, and Investment-Specific Technical Change

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto M Samaniego

Using European data, this paper finds that (i) industry entry and exit rates are positively related to industry rates of investment-specific technical change (ISTC); and (ii) the sensitivity of industry entry and exit rates to cross-country differences in entry costs depends on industry rates of ISTC. The paper constructs a general equilibrium model in which the rate of ISTC varies across industries and new investment-specific technologies can be introduced by entrants or by incumbents. In the calibrated model, equilibrium behavior is consistent with stylized facts (i) and (ii), provided the cost of technology adoption is increasing in the rate of ISTC. (JEL G31, L11, O31, O33)

Author(s):  
John Gilbert ◽  
Krit Linananda ◽  
Tanigawa Takahiko ◽  
Edward Tower ◽  
Alongkorn Tuncharoenlarp

War is costly both because of the resources used up and because of the inefficiency introduced by the higher taxes necessary to finance them. War has been justified by its ability to help an economy achieve full employment. Robert Barro argues that war increases employment because folks work harder to smooth consumption and take advantage of the higher interest rates caused by the scarcity that accompanies war. In his view, it does not reflect putting previously wasted resources to work. This article describes the simulations of a small-scale intertemporal computable general equilibrium model. It illustrates that the cost of war depends on how it is financed, and that the increase in employment that it generates may be explained by the logic that Barro offers. Our model can be loaded into GAMS, a program which is available free of charge online, so readers can themselves simulate variations of the model.


1979 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-115
Author(s):  
T. N. Srinivasan

The paper is too long for conveying the message that shadow pricing used as a method of analysis in micro-economic issues of project selection is also useful for analysing macro-economic issues, such as foreign and domestic borrowing by the government, emigration, etc. Much of the methodological discussion in the paper is available in a readily accessible form in several publications of each of the coauthors; In contrast, the specific application of the methodology to Pakistani problems is much too cavalier. While it is hard to disagree with the authors' claim that shadow pricing "constitutes a relatively informal attempt to capture general equilibrium effects" (p. 89, emphasis added), their depiction of traditional analysis is a bit of a caricature: essentially it sets up a strawman to knock down. After all in the traditional partial equilibrium analysis, the caveat is always entered that the results are possibly sensitive to violation of the ceteris paribus assumptions of the analysis, though often the analysts will claim that extreme sensitivity is unlikely. Analogously, the shadow pricing method presumes "stationarity" of shadow prices in the sense that they are “independent of policy changes under review" (p. 90). The essential point to be noted is that the validity of this assertion or of the "not too extreme sensitivity" assertion of partial equilibrium analysts can be tested only with a full scale general equilibrium model! At any rate this reviewer would not pose the issue as one of traditional partial equilibrium macro-analysis versus shadow pricing as an approximate general equilibrium analysis, but would prefer a description of project analysis as an approach in which a macro-general equilibrium model of a manageable size (implicit or explicit) is used to derive a set of key shadow prices which are then used in a detailed micro-analysis of projects.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-207
Author(s):  
Yosri Nasr Ahmed ◽  
Huang Delin ◽  
Benito Giovanni Reeberg ◽  
Victor Shaker

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document