Political Economy of the Syrian War: Patterns and Causes

Amongst all the Arab countries that have witnessed social unrest over the past decade, Syria has emerged as a unique case. What started as a peaceful social effort to bring about overdue political reform turned into a bloody conflict. The 10 year-old civil war has largely devastated the Syrian economy and is likely to have lingering consequences on the country’s development for many years to come. This article deals with the political economy of the Syrian conflict. It argues that economic liberalization, poor public policies, and persistent drought in the years preceding the crisis, upset the social equilibrium and led to unrest. The very social class that used to support the once “socialist” regime in Damascus in the period 1963–2010 felt abandoned and betrayed by its economic policies. Indeed, the transition from a state-controlled economy into a free market economy, under Bashar al-Assad, may have served Syria in many ways, but it also created many problems. The ongoing conflict can be seen as a conflict about the distribution of power and wealth and, if Syria survives it as a united country, it will likely have a political, economic, and social equilibrium drastically different from the one it had.

Solidarity and Fragmentation in Libya’s Associational Life.

This article is a sociohistorical analysis of two regions of Libya, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, following independence in 1951. Building on Pierson (2004), it focuses on path dependent trends in solidarity and the fragmentation of Libya’s associative space. It argues that associational life has played a twofold role in Libya’s political and social history. First, it actively contributed to the strengthening of resistance against colonialism and tyranny, the development of state institutions and the domestication of state power. Second, it contributed to processes of bonding within groups that compromised the development of a Libyan state, which was a factor in the onset of the Libyan civil war (2014–2020). This dual nature of the associative space is an important point of inquiry for Libyan historiography and something that is important for policymakers presiding over the country’s state, nation building and economic development to understand.

Political consensus and economic reforms in Tunisia

This article explores the role of political consensus in Tunisia in slowing reforms, following the political crisis that followed President Kais Saied’s decision to dismiss the Prime Minister and suspend parliament. It argues that the political consensus created by the 2016 Carthage agreement led to a slowing of economic reforms and triggered a political crisis. The article then considers the necessary preconditions for policymakers to make future political consensus an opportunity to endorse economic reforms that enforce accountability and advance a policy agenda that goes beyond the interests of the ruling coalition.

New Technology and the US MIC

This article considers what could be a fundamental development in the defence industrial base (DIB) in the US, namely the increased involvement of commercial technology companies in military-related business. After an outline of the dynamics and longer-term post-Cold War developments in the international arms industry, it investigates recent changes in the Pentagon's attitudes and policies to gain access to new technologies from the commercial and academic sectors. It also considers the military, technological and political drivers that have led to these technologies being sought from commercial companies for military use. It then considers the recent engagement of the major commercial technology companies in activities for the military sector and what is driving them to take up military contracts. Finally, it considers what these developments imply for the dynamics of the arms industry and the relationships within the DIB and the military industrial complex (MIC).

Humanitarian Aid and War Economies: The Case of Yemen

Although humanitarian aid (HA) is desperately needed in Yemen to cope with the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, few studies have analyzed the effect of these grants. This article provides such an analysis using 34 interviews of NGO directors and staff members in Yemen. The interviews were conducted in an open format, to enable interviewees to express all their ideas on the HA situation in Yemen, not just ones that solely fit into the frame and questions of this study. Our empirical analysis indicates that the ability of local NGOs to use and deliver supplies to those suffering is severely constrained. This is mainly due to looting by conflicting factions, corruption, and the absence of the international deterrent that obliges the conflicting parties to preserve human rights. Furthermore, this study indicates that HA is being used as a weapon of war for power and financial gain, and thus is a contributing factor in the continuation of the conflict. This means it is important that international donors explore alternative solutions to effectively deliver and distribute HA in fragile states.

Did the Qatar Blockade Work? Evidence from Trade and Consumer Welfare Three Years after the Blockade

This article examines the effects of the embargo (blockade) imposed on Qatar in June 2017 by four countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain. Using highly disaggregated product-destination quarterly trade datasets provided by the Qatar General Authority of Customs, we find a significant decline in Qatar’s aggregate imports and consumer welfare (with an increase in the prices of imported goods) in the short run, but not thereafter. Political relations with non-besieging countries seem to be associated with Qatar’s bilateral trade after the blockade, particularly in the first quarter. Shortly after the blockade, countries opposing the blockade experienced a sizable growth in exports to Qatar. In the medium to long run, Qatar succeeded in mitigating the impact of the blockade by diversifying its import origins and adopting new reforms to stabilize the economy and enhance the country’s food security and self-sufficiency.

Symposium on Middle East and North African (MENA) conflict. Part 1: An introduction

Since their independence, countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have witnessed subsequent waves of social and political conflicts. Armed and non-armed conflicts have almost become a defining feature of a region that has been struggling to find its own identity and a system that best represents its diverse communities and guarantees stability. Calibrated post-war power-sharing formulas of governance have produced authoritarianism, clientelism, elitism and a political post-war economy, where corruption, nepotism, injustice, and crony capitalism are rampant.

Restructuring state power in Sudan

Developing post-conflict economic policies in Sudan remains a significant challenge for the Sudanese transitional government and the international community. This article argues that understanding the conflict, its costs and the progress made during the current peace agreement are essential for advancing policy reforms in Sudan. The Sudanese transitional government has attempted to implement reforms, but little progress has been made because the civilian elements operate outside of the existing state power. The previous regimes policies sustained conflict(s) through both passive and active enablement of the Sudanese security forces, which means that the restructuring of state power is essential to place Sudan on the right course towards sustained democracy. This article posits that addressing structural reforms in Sudan means establishing control over the economy, defense, and security sectors.

Accounting for Numbers: Group Characteristics and the Choice of Violent and Nonviolent Tactics

Scholars have shown that nonviolent movements tend to be more successful than violent movements. A key explanation is that nonviolent movements have a mobilization advantage over violent campaigns. As nonviolent movements have lower barriers to active participation, they can expand quickly by mobilizing much larger numbers than violent movements. We argue that such a mobilization advantage is not universal, and that different movements are likely to have a comparative advantage in one tactic over another. We develop a simple model emphasizing how the ex ante potential for mobilization and prospects for success steer the choice of dissident tactics. Nonviolent tactics can be relatively more effective when a movement can mobilize more active participants than with violence, but movements with limited mobilization potential can have feasible prospects for violent dissent and a nonviolent mobilization disadvantage. We examine the implications of the model against empirical data for different types of dissident tactics and on resort to nonviolent and nonviolent dissent. We demonstrate very different actor profiles in nonviolent dissent and violent conflict, and show how each of the two types of dissent are more likely under very different settings. To compare success by types of dissent we must account for how differences in potential numbers or mobilization shape tactical choices.

Warlord Politics and Economic Clientelism in Lebanon

Since October 2019, Lebanon has been going through a deep economic and financial crisis that drove the country to a political meltdown. Facing a severe recession, high inflation and unemployment, nationwide protests in the aftermath of the Beirut explosion in August 2020 have led to the resignation of Hassan Diab’s cabinet – the second government to resign within the span of a few months. This article studies the interplay of the political, economic, and social factors that led to the current economic and political crisis. We show how warlord politics, and a corporate consociational system have misguided incentives and policies and consolidated a rentier economy that inevitably led to the current situation.