scholarly journals Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yann Algan ◽  
Pierre Cahuc

We argue civic virtue plays a key role in explaining the design of public insurance against unemployment risks by solving moral hazard issues which hinder the efficiency of unemployment insurance. We show, in a simple model, that economies with stronger civic virtues are more prone to provide insurance through unemployment benefits rather than through job protection. We provide cross-country empirical evidence of a strong correlation between civic attitudes and the design of unemployment benefits and employment protection in OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2003. We then use an epidemiological approach to estimate the existence of a potential causal relationship from inherited civic virtue to labor market insurance institutions. (JEL: J41, J65, J68, Z13)

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (155) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriana Kugler

This paper documents recent labor market performance in the Latin American region. The paper shows that unemployment, informality, and inequality have been falling over the past two decades, though still remain high. By contrast, productivity has remained stubbornly low. The paper, then, turns to the potential impacts of various labor market institutions, including employment protection legislation (EPL), minimum wages (MW), payroll taxes, unemployment insurance (UI) and collective bargaining, as well as the impacts of demographic changes on labor market performance. The paper relies on evidence from carefully conducted studies based on micro-data for countries in the region and for other countries with similar income levels to draw conclusions on the impact of labor market institutions and demographic factors on unemployment, informality, inequality and productivity. The decreases in unemployment and informality can be partly explained by the reduced strictness of EPL and payroll taxes, but also by the increased shares of more educated and older workers. By contrast, the fall in inequality starting in 2002 can be explained by a combination of binding MW throughout most of the region and, to a lesser extent, by the introduction of UI systems in some countries and the role of unions in countries with moderate unionization rates. Falling inequality can also be explained by the fall in the returns to skill associated with increased share of more educated and older workers.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 262-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel J Felbermayr ◽  
Mario Larch ◽  
Wolfgang Lechthaler

How do changes in labor market institutions, like more generous unemployment benefits in one country, affect labor market outcomes in other countries? We set up a two-country Armingtonian trade model with frictions on the goods and labor markets. Contrary to the literature, higher labor market frictions increase unemployment at home and abroad. The strength of the spillover depends on the relative size of countries and on trade costs. It is exacerbated when real wages are rigid. Using panel data for 20 rich OECD countries, and controlling for institutions as well as for business cycle comovement, we confirm our theoretical predictions. (JEL E24, F16, J64, J65)


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jørgen Svalund

Comparing the Nordic countries, this article examines different combinations of permanent and temporary employment protection legislation, and whether such differences are reflected in patterns of labor market transitions. We find higher levels of transitions from unemployment to temporary contracts in Sweden and Finland, with lax regulation of temporary contracts and strict regulation of permanent contracts. Further, temporary employees are integrated into permanent contracts in countries with lax (Denmark) or strict (Norway) regulation of permanent contracts, while this is not the case in Finland and Sweden. For these countries, the study indicates a certain degree of labor market duality, with low mobility from temporary to permanent employment contracts.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Becker

Abstract:The recently elected French President Emmanuel Macron as well as the European Commission propose to create a common budget for the Eurozone both as a financing device for infrastructure investment and as a macroeconomic stabilization instrument. Such a reform could, in principle, be rationalized if stabilization were achieved via an automatic stabilizer mechanism (such as a common unemployment insurance). This, however, would require far reaching harmonization of labor market institutions which, for now, cannot be quickly attained. Moreover, there are more pressing problems that are currently left alone. The common budget proposal thus may be interpreted as the attempt to achieve a symbolic reform success for the Eurozone intended to prove that its Member States still are able to act unanimously.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document