Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership Structure, and Foreclosure

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadav Levy ◽  
Yossi Spiegel ◽  
David Gilo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Partial Acquisitions

We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance. (JEL D21, D43, G34, L13, L22)

THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON COMPANY VALUE WITH COMPANY SIZE AS MODERATION VARIABEL

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilham Rahim ◽  
Mediaty Mediaty ◽  
R. A. Damayanti Damayanti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Company Size ◽  
Company Value

Target corporate governance, acquirers' location choices, and partial acquisitions

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 82-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Man Dang ◽  
Darren Henry ◽  
Xiangkang Yin ◽  
Thuy Anh Vo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Location Choices ◽  
Partial Acquisitions

Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoang N. Pham ◽  
Sardar M. N. Islam
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure

Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yousef Hassan ◽  
Rafiq Hijazi ◽  
Kamal Naser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies. Design/methodology/approach Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability. Findings While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations. Research limitations/implications The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system. Originality/value To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.

scholarly journals Executive board members’ remuneration: A longitudinal study

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Themistokles Lazarides ◽  
Evaggelos Drimpetas ◽  
Dimitrios N. Koufopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Financial Measures ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
Measures Of Performance

Remuneration is considered to be closely connected with financial performance (positively), firm size (positively), the organizational structure (negatively) and corporate governance mechanisms (negatively). Furthermore, a connection of ownership structure and executives’ remuneration has been well established (theoretically and empirically) in the literature (agency theory). The paper examines if these relationships are valid in Greece. Greece hasn’t the characteristics of an Anglo-Saxon country. Overall the study has shown that remuneration levels in Greece are defined by a different set of factors than the ones that are prominent in an Aglo-Saxon country. Notably, fundamental financial measures of performance are more widely used. The age of firms and corporate governance quality have a catalytic impact on remuneration levels.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and corporate governance: What does the data reveal about Saudi listed firms?

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan ◽  
Everton Dockery
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Market Instability ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Size Variable

In this paper we examine the ownership structure of 169 firms listed on the Saudi Arabian stock market from 2008 to 2014. The analysis uses the testing methodology described by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to examine the effects of firm and market instability on Saudi ownership structure and additionally, the effect of systematic regulation that imposes constraints on the behaviour of the selected listed firms. We find evidence, for the majority of the ownership structures considered, in favour of the view that firm size, regulation and instability affects ownership structure. The results suggest that the size variable has a positive effect on ownership concentration. Our analysis also shows that instability had some effect on ownership concentration and structure when using the non-linear specification, particularly when using firm specific instability, albeit the effect was stronger when the instability measure was accounting profit returns. Lastly, there is evidence that government-owned firms were mostly affected by regulation while diffused owned firms were affected most by instability than non-government owned firms.

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