scholarly journals Executive board members’ remuneration: A longitudinal study

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Themistokles Lazarides ◽  
Evaggelos Drimpetas ◽  
Dimitrios N. Koufopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Financial Measures ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
Measures Of Performance

Remuneration is considered to be closely connected with financial performance (positively), firm size (positively), the organizational structure (negatively) and corporate governance mechanisms (negatively). Furthermore, a connection of ownership structure and executives’ remuneration has been well established (theoretically and empirically) in the literature (agency theory). The paper examines if these relationships are valid in Greece. Greece hasn’t the characteristics of an Anglo-Saxon country. Overall the study has shown that remuneration levels in Greece are defined by a different set of factors than the ones that are prominent in an Aglo-Saxon country. Notably, fundamental financial measures of performance are more widely used. The age of firms and corporate governance quality have a catalytic impact on remuneration levels.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Quality, Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Firm Performance. Evidence from an Emerging Economy

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Haroon ur Rashid Khan ◽  
Waqas Bin Khidmat ◽  
Osama Al Hares ◽  
Naeem Muhammad ◽  
Kashif Saleem
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality and ownership structure on the relationship between the agency cost and firm performance. Both the fixed-effects model and a more robust dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation are applied to Chinese A-listed firms for the years 2008 to 2016. The results show that the agency–performance relationship is positively moderated by (1) corporate governance quality, (2) ownership concentration, and (3) non-state ownership. State ownership has a negative effect on the agency–performance relationship. Various robust tests of an alternative measure of agency cost confirm our main conclusions. The analysis adds to the empirical literature on agency theory by providing useful insights into how corporate governance and ownership concentration can help mitigate agency–performance relationship. It also highlights the impact of ownership type on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Our study supports the literature that agency cost and firm performance are negatively related to the Chinese listed firms. The investors should keep in mind the proxies of agency cost while choosing a specific stock. Secondly; the abuse of managerial appropriation is higher in state-held firms as compared to non-state firms. Policymakers can use these results to devise the investor protection rules so that managerial appropriation can be minimized.

scholarly journals Board Size, Non-Executive Board Members and Financial Performance in Non-Usury Banks in Iran

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
GholamReza Karami ◽  
Tahere Karimiyan ◽  
MohammadSadegh Ghaznavi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Result Show

<p>Prior studies investigating the relation between the financial performance and corporate governance mechanisms for firms in Tehran Stock Exchange mainly exclude banks due to their different types of rules and structure. We study the relation between corporate governance structure and financial performance of the banks under the non-usury banking act. We study various corporate governance factors including board size and the number of non-executive board members using a sample of 21 banks for 2010 to 2012. Result show a significant positive correlation among board size and financial performance. However, non-executive board members do not correlate with financial performance.</p>

Conditional Conservatism and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hye Seung (Grace) Lee ◽  
Xu Li ◽  
Heibatollah Sami
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Potential Benefit ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Debt Contracting ◽  
Conditional Conservatism ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
The Impact

SYNOPSIS In this study, we examine the impact of conditional conservatism on audit fees and, more importantly, the influence of corporate governance on this relationship. Prior literature presents evidence regarding explanations for the existence and pervasiveness of accounting conservatism such as compensation and debt contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation. However, there is very limited evidence or discussion of the potential benefit of accounting conservatism on audit risk and thus audit fees, and how the potential benefit can be attenuated by corporate governance quality. Using a sample of firm-year observations over the period of 2004–2009, we provide evidence consistent with conditional conservatism and firms' commitment to such conservatism reducing their audit fees. However, our evidence shows that this reduction in audit fees is moderated by higher corporate governance quality. These results have implications for auditors, regulators, standard setters, and firms' managers. In addition, our study extends the literature on the determinants of audit fees. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; D81; D22.

scholarly journals Role of International Trade Competitive Advantage and Corporate Governance Quality in Predicting Equity Returns: Static and Conditional Model Proposals for an Emerging Market

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
Erol Muzir ◽  
Cevdet Kizil ◽  
Burak Ceylan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Robust Regression ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Static Model ◽  
Conditional Model ◽  
Portfolio Returns ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality

This paper aims to develop some static and conditional (dynamic) models to predict portfolio returns in the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) that are calibrated to combine the capital asset-pricing model (CAPM) and corporate governance quality. In our conditional model proposals, both the traditional CAPM (beta) coefficient and model constant are allowed to vary on a binary basis with any degradation or improvement in the country’s international trade competitiveness, and meanwhile a new variable is added to the models to represent the portfolio’s sensitivity to excess returns on the governance portfolio (BIST Governance) over the market. Some robust and Bayesian linear models have been derived using the monthly capital gains between December 2009 and December 2019 of four leading index portfolios. A crude measure is then introduced that we think can be used in assessing governance quality of portfolios. This is called governance quality score (GQS). Our robust regression findings suggest both superiority of conditional models assuming varying beta coefficients over static model proposals and significant impact of corporate governance quality on portfolio returns. The Bayesian model proposals, however, exhibited robust findings that favor the static model with fixed beta estimates and were lacking in supporting significance of corporate governance quality.

How firms' performance mediates the relationship between corporate governance quality and earnings quality?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Adel Elzahaby
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Analytical Model ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Direct Path ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Indirect Path ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Financial Performance Measures ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to propose an analytical model that investigates both a direct path between corporate governance quality and earnings quality and an indirect path, in which firms' performance is a mediating variable that is influenced by corporate governance quality and that, in turn, influences earnings quality.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs a structural equation modelling (SEM), to a sample of Egyptian listed firms during 2011–2017, to test the proposed analytical model and to determine the relative importance of both the direct and indirect paths.FindingsThe findings show a statistically significant evidence of both a direct path from corporate governance quality to earnings quality, and an indirect path that is mediated by firms' performance, suggesting that both corporate governance quality and performance have a complementary effect on earnings quality. However, the weight of the evidence favouring the direct path is more important in case of accounting-based performance measures; and the weight of the evidence favouring the indirect path is more important in case of market-based performance measures.Research limitations/implicationsThe current study has some limitations. First, the study focuses specifically on one proxy for measuring earnings quality which is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Other proxies of earnings quality could be examined in future research, such as income smoothing, earnings persistence and timely loss recognition. Another limitation is that only financial performance measures were examined, namely, return on assets, return on equity, price-to-earnings ratio and market-to-book value. Notwithstanding, non-financial performance measures could be investigated in future studies, such as balanced scorecard (BSC). Furthermore, considering cultural, political and legislative differences among countries, the results may not be generalised outside the scope of the current sample (i.e. Egyptian listed firms).Practical implicationsThe implications of the findings for both theory and practice are discussed.Originality/valueThis study is distinguished by validating an analytical model that has been overlooked by prior studies. Moreover, it provides a new constructed index for measuring corporate governance quality. Furthermore, it uses a new sophisticated statistical technique, which is SEM, for testing the proposed model.

Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yousef Hassan ◽  
Rafiq Hijazi ◽  
Kamal Naser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies. Design/methodology/approach Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability. Findings While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations. Research limitations/implications The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system. Originality/value To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Quality and Capital Structure Decisions: Empirical Evidence from Canada

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (9) ◽  
pp. 303-311
Author(s):  
Dan Lin ◽  
Lu Lin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Composite Index ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance quality and capital structure of firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index between 2009 and 2012. Using an aggregate corporate governance index, this study finds support for the outcome hypothesis, which argues that capital structure is an “outcome” of corporate governance quality. Governance quality is found to be positively associated with firms’ leverage. Firms with lower governance quality have lower leverage as these firms’ managers do not like to have only little free cash flow leftover or have extra constraints imposed by debt financing. In contrast, firms with higher governance quality are more leveraged because these firms have lower agency costs and thus lower cost of debt financing. As a result, they can take on more debts. The empirical evidence from this study illuminates important links between governance quality and financing decisions of firms.

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