Assessing and detaining those who are mentally disordered under the Mental Health Act 1983 and Mental Capacity Act 2005: Part 1

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-14
Author(s):  
Sara Fovargue ◽  
José Miola
Author(s):  
Matthew McKillop ◽  
John Dawson ◽  
George Szmukler

<p>In England and Wales, there are now two regimes under which an adult can be deprived of liberty when receiving mental health treatment: the regime established by the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA), and the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS) authorisation regime established by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). Where both regimes might apply to a mentally disordered person in hospital for mental health treatment, a major dividing line between them is the ability of the patient to “object” to being a mental health patient or to being given mental health treatment. If such an objection occurs, a hospitalised patient is ineligible for the DOLS regime and only the MHA regime may be used to authorise the deprivation of their liberty.</p>


2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 226-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Hall ◽  
Afia Ali

SummaryThe new Mental Health Act 2007 for England and Wales has introduced substantial amendments to the 1983 Mental Health Act and has also amended the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Most provisions came into effect in November 2008. the introduction of supervised community treatment, changes to professional roles such as the role of ‘responsible clinician’, and the introduction of deprivation of liberty safeguards in the Mental Capacity Act are discussed. Many of the new safeguards in the Act are welcomed by clinicians and service user groups. However, other changes are more controversial and could potentially lead to an increase in the work load of clinicians.


Author(s):  
Jo Beswick ◽  
Michael Gunn

This chapter examines the legal framework for the treatment of the mentally disordered offender in the community in England and Wales. It examines both some of the ideological questions underlying the care of this group and the legal mechanisms within which treatment can be provided. The chapter begins by examining the principle, endorsed by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, that voluntary treatment will usually be the norm, regardless of setting. It then considers exceptions to these norm situations where legally mandated treatment in the community is permitted. In England and Wales, most of these exceptions are to be found in three pieces of legislation: the Mental Health Act 1983, as amended in 2007 to include community treatment orders; the Mental Capacity Act 2005, with its associated Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS); and the Criminal Justice Act 2003.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 187-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Finch

John Finch, a legal member of the Mental Health Act Commission for England and Wales from its creation by statute in 1983 until 1991, takes a fresh look at the uncomfortable history of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and asks whether the Act has served any useful purpose.


Author(s):  
Aswini Weereratne

<p>In light of the plethora of new provisions safeguarding patients who might previously have been cared for and treated informally, it may be instructive to consider who may now be considered a truly informal patient, i.e. one for whom neither process nor formality is needed. When applied to an incapacitated<br />patient requiring treatment for mental disorder, the word “informal” may now seem oxymoronic and possibly redundant. Can such a patient ever be truly informal? Part IV of the model statute suggests that an informal patient is one who lacks capacity and does not object to proposed treatment which is in their best interests, or a patient who may be treated without the use of compulsory powers; but even such a patient must now be subject to some formality if their care or treatment is to be long term or they are to be deprived of their liberty in order to ensure proper safeguards are in place.</p><p>Currently the boundary between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“MCA”) and Mental Health Act 1983 (“MHA”) is essentially one determined by whether the patient objects to treatment and is defined with formidable complexity in schedule 1A to the MCA. A patient eligible for MCA deprivation of liberty (“DOL”) safeguards, who could be an elderly person in long term residential care, is now subject to formal<br />processes. There is little true informality for a patient lacking treatment capacity. It is questionable whether even a capacitated patient with mental disorder, who is by definition vulnerable, may be treated informally under the MHA4 if they feel suborned into consenting by the possibility of coercion. The terminology offers a slightly deceptive impression of a benign approach with concomitant levels of<br />autonomy, but while it is appropriate to highlight a difference from compulsory process and keep formality to a minimum for the sake of informality, it is also important not to overplay formality in the name of safeguards. The latter appears to be the vice in which the MCA and MHA is now arguably gripped.</p>


2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 430-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Brindle ◽  
Tim Branton

SummaryThe deprivation of liberty safeguards were introduced into the Mental Capacity Act in 2008 to enhance the protection of adults in residential homes or hospitals who lack capacity in relation to their care arrangements and who are or may be deprived of their liberty. Deprivation of liberty itself is an imprecise concept and there may be difficulty in applying the appropriate authority where there is a choice between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act 1983. Therefore, this article explains the evolution of mental capacity legislation and the concept of deprivation of liberty, how it may be recognised, prevented and authorised by deprivation of liberty safeguards, along with some of the interface issues with the Mental Health Act 1983.


2006 ◽  
Vol 188 (6) ◽  
pp. 504-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dawson ◽  
George Szmukler

SummaryThe enactment of a single legislative scheme governing nonconsensual treatment of both ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ illnesses, based on incapacity principles, has been mooted in recent law reform debates in the UK. We propose a framework for such legislation and consider in more detail the provisions it should contain. The design of legislation that combines the strengths of both incapacity and civil commitment schemes can be readily imagined, based on the criteria for intervention in England and Wales found in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Such legislation would reduce unjustified legal discrimination against mentally disordered persons and apply consistent ethical principles across medical law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (16) ◽  
pp. 170
Author(s):  
Richard Jones

<p align="LEFT">The provisions of the Mental Health Act 2007 which amend the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) so as to provide for a procedure that can be used to authorise the deprivation of the liberty of a mentally incapacitated person are intended to sit alongside existing Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) powers. But the nature of the relationship between the two Acts is far from clear. This article suggests that the new MCA procedure could be very much the poor relation of the MHA.</p>


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (13) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Phil Fennell

<p align="LEFT">This paper considers what has come to be known as the ‘interface’ between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act 1983. Until the 2005 Act comes into force in 2007, practitioners will have to be aware of the interface between powers to admit to institutional care and treat without consent under common law and those which exist under the Mental Health Act 1983.</p><p align="LEFT">In simple terms, the interface question is ‘When may the common law or, after 2007, the 2005 Act, be used to admit to institutional care and treat without consent, and when will use of the Mental Health Act be required?’ This article argues that there are two decisions of the European Court which need to be considered in determining how to bridge what has become the “Bournewood gap”: <em>HL v United Kingdom</em> and <em>Storck v Germany</em>. These will require that the State must provide effective supervisory mechanisms to ensure that mentally incapacitated people are not deprived of their liberty (Article 5) and do not have their right of bodily integrity interfered with (Article 8) without lawful authority.</p>


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