scholarly journals Qualitative decision theory via channel theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard Allwein ◽  
Yingrui Yang ◽  
William L. Harrison

2002 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Didier Dubois ◽  
Hélène Fargier ◽  
Henri Prade ◽  
Patrice Perny


Author(s):  
Nahla Ben Amor ◽  
Helene Fargier ◽  
Régis Sabbadin

The present paper proposes the first definition of mixed equilibrium for ordinal games. This definition naturally extends possibilistic (single agent) decision theory. This allows us to provide a unifying view of single and multi-agent qualitative decision theory. Our first contribution is to show that ordinal games always admit a possibilistic mixed equilibrium, which can be seen as a qualitative counterpart to mixed (probabilistic) equilibrium.Then, we show that a possibilistic mixed equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time (wrt the size of the game), which contrasts with pure Nash or mixed probabilistic equilibrium computation in cardinal game theory.The definition we propose is thus operational in two ways: (i) it tackles the case when no pure Nash equilibrium exists in an ordinal game; and (ii) it allows an efficient computation of a mixed equilibrium.



Author(s):  
Didier Dubois ◽  
Lluís Godo ◽  
Henri Prade ◽  
Adriana Zapico




2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florence Dupin de Saint-Cyr ◽  
Romain Guillaume


Author(s):  
EMILIANO LORINI

Abstarct We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents’ cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory including the concepts of knowledge, belief, strong belief, conditional belief, desire, conditional desire, strong desire, and preference. We also present two extensions of the logic, one by the notion of choice and the other by dynamic operators for belief change and desire change, and we apply the former to the analysis of single-stage games under incomplete information. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the basic logic and for its two extensions.



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