qualitative decision theory
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

12
(FIVE YEARS 1)

H-INDEX

6
(FIVE YEARS 0)

Author(s):  
EMILIANO LORINI

Abstarct We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents’ cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory including the concepts of knowledge, belief, strong belief, conditional belief, desire, conditional desire, strong desire, and preference. We also present two extensions of the logic, one by the notion of choice and the other by dynamic operators for belief change and desire change, and we apply the former to the analysis of single-stage games under incomplete information. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the basic logic and for its two extensions.



Author(s):  
Nahla Ben Amor ◽  
Helene Fargier ◽  
Régis Sabbadin

The present paper proposes the first definition of mixed equilibrium for ordinal games. This definition naturally extends possibilistic (single agent) decision theory. This allows us to provide a unifying view of single and multi-agent qualitative decision theory. Our first contribution is to show that ordinal games always admit a possibilistic mixed equilibrium, which can be seen as a qualitative counterpart to mixed (probabilistic) equilibrium.Then, we show that a possibilistic mixed equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time (wrt the size of the game), which contrasts with pure Nash or mixed probabilistic equilibrium computation in cardinal game theory.The definition we propose is thus operational in two ways: (i) it tackles the case when no pure Nash equilibrium exists in an ordinal game; and (ii) it allows an efficient computation of a mixed equilibrium.



2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florence Dupin de Saint-Cyr ◽  
Romain Guillaume


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard Allwein ◽  
Yingrui Yang ◽  
William L. Harrison


2008 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 385-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Dubois ◽  
H. Fargier ◽  
J. Bonnefon

Making a decision is often a matter of listing and comparing positive and negative arguments. In such cases, the evaluation scale for decisions should be considered bipolar, that is, negative and positive values should be explicitly distinguished. That is what is done, for example, in Cumulative Prospect Theory. However, contraryto the latter framework that presupposes genuine numerical assessments, human agents often decide on the basis of an ordinal ranking of the pros and the cons, and by focusing on the most salient arguments. In other terms, the decision process is qualitative as well as bipolar. In this article, based on a bipolar extension of possibility theory, we define and axiomatically characterize several decision rules tailored for the joint handling of positive and negative arguments in an ordinal setting. The simplest rules can be viewed as extensions of the maximin and maximax criteria to the bipolar case, and consequently suffer from poor decisive power. More decisive rules that refine the former are also proposed. These refinements agree both with principles of efficiency and with the spirit of order-of-magnitude reasoning, that prevails in qualitative decision theory. The most refined decision rule uses leximin rankings of the pros and the cons, and the ideas of counting arguments of equal strength and cancelling pros by cons. It is shown to come down to a special case of Cumulative Prospect Theory, and to subsume the ``Take the Best'' heuristic studied by cognitive psychologists.





2002 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Didier Dubois ◽  
Hélène Fargier ◽  
Henri Prade ◽  
Patrice Perny


Author(s):  
Didier Dubois ◽  
Lluís Godo ◽  
Henri Prade ◽  
Adriana Zapico


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document