Sharing Meanings about Embodied Meaning

2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Wahman
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Meaning

Embodied Meaning in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ciavatta
Keyword(s):  
Aesthetic Experience ◽  
Distinctive Character ◽  
Embodied Meaning ◽  
The One

AbstractIn this paper it is argued that the conceptions of embodied meaning and of intuition that Hegel appeals to in the Aesthetics anticipate some of Merleau-Ponty’s insights concerning the distinctive character of pre-conceptual, sensuous forms of meaning. It is argued that, for Hegel, our aesthetic experience of the beautiful is such that we cannot readily differentiate in it the purportedly distinct roles that sensation and thought play, and so that the account of sensuous intuition operative here differs from the one appealed to in more familiar, ‘intellectualist’ conceptions that are premised upon our being able to make such a distinction. Some of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights are brought to bear to help support and illuminate some of the implications of Hegel’s conception of such sensuously embodied meaning.

Embodied meaning and negative priming

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 644-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur M. Glenberg ◽  
David A. Robertson ◽  
Michael P. Kaschak ◽  
Alan J. Malter
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Negative Priming ◽  
Perception And Action ◽  
Cognitive Representations ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Embodied Meaning ◽  
Standard Models

Standard models of cognition are built from abstract, amodal, arbitrary symbols, and the meanings of those symbols are given solely by their interrelations. The target article (Glenberg 1997t) argues that these models must be inadequate because meaning cannot arise from relations among abstract symbols. For cognitive representations to be meaningful they must, at the least, be grounded; but abstract symbols are difficult, if not impossible, to ground. As an alternative, the target article developed a framework in which representations are grounded in perception and action, and hence are embodied. Recent work (Glenberg & Robertson 1999; 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak 2002; Kaschak & Glenberg 2000) extends this framework to language.

The iconicity of embodied meaning. Polysemy of spatial prepositions in the cognitive framework

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 733-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fieke Van der Gucht ◽  
Klaas Willems ◽  
Ludovic De Cuypere
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Prepositions ◽  
Cognitive Framework ◽  
Embodied Meaning

Embodied meaning construction

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hermann Kappelhoff ◽  
Cornelia Müller
Keyword(s):  
Film Theory ◽  
Meaning Construction ◽  
Feature Film ◽  
Expressive Movement ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Basic Tenet ◽  
Embodied Meaning ◽  
Sensory Qualities ◽  
The Spectator

In this article, we argue that multimodal metaphors are grounded in the dynamics of felt experiences. Felt experiences are inherently affective, with immediate sensory qualities and an affective stance. We suggest that as such, they ground the emergence and activation of metaphors. We illustrate this idea with analyzed data from a film and face-to-face conversation. Our consideration of expressive movement in speech, gestures, and feature film does not therefore target the analysis of the speech and gestures of actors. Rather we suggest an approach firmly rooted in film theory, and which considers films as composed of cinematic expressive movements. The basic tenet of our proposal is as follows: seeing cinematic expressive movements trigger the same kind of felt experience in the spectator as a bodily expressive movement that comes along with speech. Expressive movements are held to provide the experiential ‘embodied’ grounds for the construction of metaphors.

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