In recent years, a proliferation of central governmental projects has been taking place within the Chinese government bureaucracy. In order for us to understand this phenomenon, we need to examine both the bureaucracy and the project system. This article proposes three key features of the project system, which tends to be temporary, goal-oriented, and flexible, as well as innovative in institutional design. A comparison of these features with the basic elements of bureaucracy shows that underneath the superficial fusion of the two systems there is unavoidable tension. Given the fact that the Chinese bureaucracy lacks structural constraints and public participation in its decision-making process, projects seldom meet the target of an appropriate supply–demand equation. Tensions are particularly manifested in two areas: (1) projects are inter-departmental and temporary in nature while bureaucracy is always rigid and insular; and (2) projects are goal-oriented and flexible while bureaucracy is rule-oriented and hierarchical. In most cases, central governmental projects have to operate within the government bureaucracy, and thus we call the system a ‘bureaucratized project system.’ In our case study, we find that the bureaucracy resists the project integration reform because its power is being threatened even though it is apparently beneficial for project operations. We are not optimistic about the future of the project integration reform as the task has now been laid upon the already over-loaded and wrongly-motivated local governments while the state bureaucracy remains all powerful.
Improving the Modeling of Disease Data from the Government Surveillance System: A Case Study on Malaria in the Brazilian Amazon
