scholarly journals Formal Theodicy: Religious Determinism and the Logical Problem of Evil

2021 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 93-119
Author(s):  
Gesiel Borges da Silva ◽  
◽  
Fábio Maia Bertato ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence W. Tilley

This article addresses three problems and suggests ways to address these problems. First, Christian theology has often been supersessionist, especially in Christology and Mariology. Claims about Jesus and Mary being exceptional (in different ways) often involve forms of supersessionism. I report on two theological works that attempt to be orthodoxly Catholic and to avoid supersessionism. Second, I address the conflict between affirming the irrevocable covenant God made with Israel and the universality of salvation God wrought in Jesus. I argue herein that the key problem is logical, not theological. Hence, we should not seek to resolve this problem theoretically, but to dissolve it logically in a manner analogous to the way philosophers of religion have dissolved the logical problem of evil. Third, some have suggested that a commitment to true interreligious dialogue should weaken our commitment to our own tradition. I disagree and show that interreligious dialogue can, in practice, strengthen, not weaken, our commitments to our home tradition. 


God and Evil ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 17-32
Author(s):  
Michael L. Peterson

2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-446
Author(s):  
AMIR HOROWITZ

AbstractIn an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. That is, he defends the consistency of the obtaining of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and good creator. The basic idea of Pearce's solution to the logical problem of evil is that according to the teleological theory of intentionality, which is self-consistent and consistent with the claim that God exists, some evil is necessary for the existence of created minds, and this evil is outweighed by the good that is involved in the existence of created minds. The present article argues that this suggestion fails to solve the problem.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Scott M. Coley

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 268
Author(s):  
Edward Feser

In his book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’, James Sterba argues that the existence of much of the evil to be found in the world is logically incompatible with the existence of God. I defend the Thomistic view that when one properly understands the nature of God and of his relationship to the world, this so-called logical problem of evil does not arise. While Sterba has responded to the version of the Thomistic position presented by Brian Davies, I argue that his response fails.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-435
Author(s):  
KENNETH L. PEARCE

AbstractThis article provides a new defence against the logical problem of evil, based on the naturalistic functional/teleological theory of mind (NFT). I argue that if the NFT is self-consistent then it is consistent with theism. Further, the NFT entails that it is not possible for created minds to exist in the absence of evil. It follows that if the NFT is self-consistent then the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil.


2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-452
Author(s):  
Jerome Gellman ◽  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document