scholarly journals The Problem of Evil, Skeptical Theism and Moral Epistemology

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Scott M. Coley

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether.

Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy

Prior formulations of the problem of evil, for example, by J. L. Mackie, William Rowe, and Paul Draper, assume that God must have requiring reasons to prevent evils to creatures, and use that assumption as the basis for claiming that the existence (or types, or amount, or distribution) of evils in this world is either incompatible with or gives strong prima facie evidence against the existence of God. But given that God’s reasons with respect to preventing evils are justifying, not requiring, reasons, no such arguments can get off the ground. This account, which is based on a first-order theory of divine ethics, differs from skeptical theism, which is based on moral epistemology. This difference makes the account developed here immune from the most serious criticisms that have made trouble for skeptical theism.


Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Michelle Panchuk

This paper demonstrates that the skeptical theist’s response to the problem of evil deprives the analytic theologian of theoretical resources necessary to avoid accepting as veridical merely apparent divine commands that endorse cruelty. In particular, I argue that the same skeptical considerations that lead analytic theologians to endorse skeptical theism also lead to what I call “divine command skepticism”—an inability to make certain kinds of judgements about what a good God would or would not command. The danger of divine command skepticism is not that it generates new reasons to think that God has commanded horrors, but, rather, that it undercuts the defeaters we might otherwise have for thinking that God has commanded those horrors.  It does so both by rendering illicit certain theological and hermeneutical methodologies employed within liberatory frameworks (i.e., various kinds of liberation theologies) and by depriving the theologian of some of the more “traditional” mechanisms for resolving such apparent conflicts.


Author(s):  
Laura W. Ekstrom

This chapter summarizes the case that has been made in the book in defense of the argument from pointless evils and the argument from the facts about evil in support of atheism. It highlights important claims about agency and claims about value that have been brought out by close examination of the punishment theodicy, the free will theodicy, the character-building theodicy, the divine intimacy theodicy, and the position of skeptical theism. The chapter also points toward directions for further work on the problem of evil in the philosophy of religion.


Author(s):  
Ayon Maharaj

This chapter adopts a cross-cultural approach to the problem of evil by bringing Sri Ramakrishna into conversation with recent analytic philosophers. Maharaj begins by exploring the philosophical resonances between Sri Ramakrishna’s skeptical theism and William Alston’s skeptical theist refutation of William Rowe’s argument from evil. On the one hand, Maharaj draws on Alston’s skeptical theist response to Rowe as a means of developing and defending Sri Ramakrishna’s own skeptical theist position. On the other, Maharaj argues that Alston’s failure to consider Indian karma-based theodicies significantly weakens his argument. Maharaj then brings Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy into dialogue with Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy. Hick’s convincing arguments for the necessity of evil in a soul-making environment lend support to Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy. However, Maharaj also identifies major weaknesses in Hick’s soul-making theodicy, which stem from Hick’s assumption of a one-life-only paradigm and his neglect of mystical experience. On this basis, Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna’s mystically grounded saint-making theodicy, which presupposes the doctrines of karma and rebirth, has significant advantages over Hick’s theodicy.


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