Paradoxical Aspects of the Russellian Conception of Existence

In this paper, the authors try to clarify the relations between Meinong’s and Russell's thoughts on the ontological ideas of existence. The Meinongian theory on non-existent objects does not in itself violate the principle of non-contradiction, since the problem that this hypothesis offers to the theory of definite descriptions is not so much a logical problem as an ontological problem. To demonstrate this we will establish what we believe are the two main theses basic to the theory of descriptions: the epistemological thesis and logical thesis.

Fate and Foreknowledge in Greek Philosophy

The majority of this chapter focuses on Greek philosophical approaches to fate and foreknowledge. To understand the background of Origen’s thought on these topics, we must distinguish between three distinct types of problem: a) logical problems that concern the possibility of making true statements about the contingent future, b) the problem of how human beings can be held morally responsible for their actions if their actions are fated, and c) the problem of how human beings can choose freely between courses of action if God (or the gods) can have foreknowledge of the future. This chapter shows where and why these conceptions of fate, prophecy, and human autonomy differ, and why these distinctions matter. First, it examines the puzzles set and answered by Aristotle concerning the logical problem of future contingent statements. Then it explores some of the terminological difficulty in talking about ‘free will’ in the Greek context. Next it examines Stoic and Platonist discussions about choice and autonomy, which focus primarily on ethical considerations. Finally, it argues that Origen’s framing of these issues was heavily influenced by his pagan near-contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias. The chapter ends with a survey of some other early Christian texts on autonomy and moral responsibility that show the Christian context in which Origen was arguing and sets the stage for the argument that Origen deviates significantly from his Christian contemporaries.

THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL IN ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY: A Comparative Approach in the Thought System of Ibn Sînâ and Richard Swinburne

<p><strong>Abstract: </strong>The study of the ideas of Ibn Sînâ and Richard Swinburne as the pioneers of Islamic philosophy and the West philosophy, and on the other hand, the existing scholastic and ideological differences, is something that can help us to become more familiar with the thoughts of these philosophers and intellectual differences and similarities. In this research, with the analytical method and using the necessary documents, the nature, types, and solutions of evil in the thought of Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne are examined, and also the two philosophers’ thoughts about evil are compared. Both philosophers have considered the existence of evil not in contradiction with the divine attributes, but it is necessary for the acquisition of good, the minimum existence of which is necessary for the best system of creation.<strong> </strong><br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Abstrak:</strong> Kajian terhadap pemikiran Ibn Sînâ dan Richard Swinburne tentang kejahatan menjadi menarik untuk dianalisis karena perbedaan horizon berpikir keduanya. Jika Ibn Sînâ mewakili tradisi filsafat Islam, maka Richard Swinburne dianggap mewakili filsafat Barat kontemporer. Dalam artikel ini, penulis menganalisis dari dokumen kepustakaan yang diperlukan, baik tentang sifat, jenis, dan solusi atas kejahatan menurut pandangan Ibn Sînâ dan Swinburne. Bagi kedua filsuf, eksistensi kejahatan tidak bertentangan dengan sifat-sifat ilahi, tetapi ia diperlukan untuk memperoleh kebaikan dan keberadaan minimum yang diperlukan untuk sistem penciptaan perbuatan terbaik.</p><p><br /><strong>Keywords:</strong> evil, Ibn Sînâ, Richard Swinburne, Divine attributes, world of creation<em></em></p>

Neural Correlates of Causal Inferences in Discourse Understanding and Logical Problem-Solving: A Meta-Analysis Study

In discourse comprehension, we need to draw inferences to make sense of discourse. Previous neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural correlates of causal inferences in discourse understanding. However, these findings have been divergent, and how these types of inferences are related to causal inferences in logical problem-solving remains unclear. Using the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) approach, the current meta-analysis analyzed 19 experiments on causal inferences in discourse understanding and 20 experiments on those in logical problem-solving to identify the neural correlates of these two cognitive processes and their shared and distinct neural correlates. We found that causal inferences in discourse comprehension recruited a left-lateralized frontotemporal brain system, including the left inferior frontal gyrus, the left middle temporal gyrus (MTG), and the bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), while causal inferences in logical problem-solving engaged a nonoverlapping brain system in the frontal and parietal cortex, including the left inferior frontal gyrus, the bilateral middle frontal gyri, the dorsal MPFC, and the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL). Furthermore, the pattern similarity analyses showed that causal inferences in discourse understanding were primarily related to the terms about language processing and theory-of-mind processing. Both types of inferences were found to be related to the terms about memory and executive function. These findings suggest that causal inferences in discourse understanding recruit distinct neural bases from those in logical problem-solving and rely more on semantic knowledge and social interaction experiences.

The Sovereignty of Humanity and Social Responsibility for Evil Prevention

In this paper, I suggest that James Sterba’s recent restatement of the logical problem of evil overlooks a plausible theistic interpretation of the divine–human relation, which allows for a theodicy impervious to his atheological argument, which boils down to God’s failure to meet Sterba’s “Evil Prevention Requirements”. I argue that such requirements need not apply to God in a world under full human sovereignty, which presupposes that God never intervenes to change the natural course of events to prevent evils, as God has a decisive “greater good justification” for not intervening, namely respecting human sovereignty. This non-interventionist view of divine providence can be made tenable by the great good and dignity of the God-granted human God-like self-creativity implied by human sovereignty (a concept inspired by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola). The Mirandolian theodicy can both accommodate and complement Dostoyevsky’s Russian Orthodox view of “beneficial suffering”, predicated against the background of the conception of “collective selfhood”, overlooked by Sterba despite “featuring” on the cover of his book, no doubt due to his libertarian–individualistic assumptions about human agency and human flourishing, which a proponent of a theistic theodicy may do well to resist.

Imagineering Learning With Logical Problem Solving

This study aimed at developing an imagineering learning process model with logical solutions by using documentary research and relevant experts&rsquo; viewpoints with regard to the process of Imagineering Learning&mdash;problem-based learning (PBL) involving logical and computational thinking. The data were then synthesized in order to find the relationship of learning theory to achieve an Imagineering Learning process by solving logic problems. The analysis of related documents and research revealed that the Imagineering Learning process involving logical problem solving consisted of 6 important steps as follows: 1) the problem-solving stage, 2) the problem-solving design stage, 3) the innovation development stage, 4) the innovation presentation, 5) the innovation improvement stage, 6) the evaluation stage. The aforementioned learning process can also result in the development of students&rsquo; innovative skills, and encouraging learners to develop such skills. The emphasis in terms of the Imagineering process is to create inspiration for the imagination of things that do not yet occur. The process then continues with innovation development by using the PBL process in which students learn solution thinking, focusing on logically-prioritizing problems and their causes and effects. This creates structural and systematic learning through practice, so that students can develop the ability to seek knowledge and develop problem-solving abilities.

The Problem of Evil, Skeptical Theism and Moral Epistemology

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether.

The Thomistic Dissolution of the Logical Problem of Evil

In his book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’, James Sterba argues that the existence of much of the evil to be found in the world is logically incompatible with the existence of God. I defend the Thomistic view that when one properly understands the nature of God and of his relationship to the world, this so-called logical problem of evil does not arise. While Sterba has responded to the version of the Thomistic position presented by Brian Davies, I argue that his response fails.