Teleosemantic theories are diverse, but they all endorse the claim that semantic norms, to do with correct and incorrect representation, derive in part at least from functional norms, to do with normal or proper functioning. Informational teleosemantics adds that semantic norms also derive from natural-factiveinformation. In this chapter, The author starts with the premise defended in chapter 3–– in explaining how bodies and brains operate, biologists use a notion of normal-proper function. To this the author adds that the same notion of function is used in explaining cognitive (including perceptual) capacities, and then argue that, given an information-processing approach, the norms of proper functioning are thus wedded to the aboutness of natural-factive information, so that a basic form of normative aboutness is posited. This elucidates the explanatory role of positing nonconceptual representations, establishes the scientific credentials of informational teleosemantics, and gives us good reason to try to solve its alleged problems. In the last few sections, the author argues that the main naturalistic “alternatives” to teleosemantics also have apparently ineliminableteleosemantic commitments.
Some Concerns Regarding Explanatory Pluralism: The Explanatory Role of Optimality Models
