scholarly journals 5. Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and Its Application to the American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview

Author(s):  
Justin A. Joyce

This chapter engages with interdisciplinary scholarship on legal systems and revenge in order to argue that the Western, like other genres which seek to provide justifications for violence, has informed and been influenced by paradigmatic shifts in the American legal system. A fuller investigation into the style of the gunslinger's vengeance, this chapter argues, suggests a rather different relationship between cultural products and legal apparatuses than that suggested by critics who portray the Western revenger as a reactionary figure. The Western gunslinger is presented here instead as a progressive figure by reading the cultural work of the Western genre as a rhetorical thinking through of a set of interconnected conflicts and inconsistencies in American legal paradigms related to justifiable homicide and gun possession.


2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-401
Author(s):  
Hanina Ben-Menahem

The claim that talmudic law is a religious legal system has long been, and continues to be, put forward by both traditional scholars of Jewish law and contemporary academic researchers.The question of whether talmudic law is a religious legal system most certainly did not engage the Sages of the Talmud, but addressing it will help us grasp the nature of talmudic law. Furthermore, juxtaposing talmudic law to Biblical law will help us delineate the concept of religious law, and shed light on certain developments in the evolution of Jewish law.Let us consider what this claim entails. Sometimes the assertion that a given legal system is a religious legal system merely seeks to indicate that it is part of a certain religion or was created within the framework of that religion. Such an assertion does not provide any information about the nature of the said system, just as the phrase “French law” says nothing more than that the system is used in France.


1980 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shmuel Shilo

The Jewish legal system's concept ofKofin al midat S'dom(kofin, in this essay) is a rule of equity whose scope of application is almost without parallel in other legal systems. Strict translation of this phrase, which is “one is compelled not to act in the manner of Sodom” is not very helpful. The rule is interpreted to mean that if A has a legal right and the infringement of such right by B will cause no loss to A but will remove some harm from, or bring a benefit to B, then the infringement of A's right will be allowed. Such a concept at once brings to mind the modern view concerning abuse of rights. There is, in fact, much in common between the two principles but they are certainly not the same. According to one legal system a certain given fact situation can have the legal principle of abuse of rights applied to it, while in another legal system a different rule of law would be resorted to. To illustrate: In certain jurisdictions the right to privacy is based on the concept of abuse of rights, while in others, as is the case in Jewish law, such a right is independent of the equivalent abuse of rights—kofin. So with other rights such as the right to light or unfair trade competition. An attempt will be made in this essay to show the range and the limits of thekofinprinciple. We will discuss those problems which are dealt with within the framework ofkofineven if their non-Jewish parallel is one which is far from the concept of abuse of rights. Conversely, we will not examine those questions which, in other legal systems, fall within the ambit of abuse of rights but are not looked upon, in Jewish law, as problems to which the rule ofkofinis to be applied, since they have been solved by other legal rules.


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