‘A kind of wild justice’: revenge and constitutional commentary in the Western

2018 ◽  
pp. 28-47
Author(s):  
Justin A. Joyce
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Cultural Work ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Cultural Products ◽  
System A ◽  
American Legal System ◽  
Interdisciplinary Scholarship

This chapter engages with interdisciplinary scholarship on legal systems and revenge in order to argue that the Western, like other genres which seek to provide justifications for violence, has informed and been influenced by paradigmatic shifts in the American legal system. A fuller investigation into the style of the gunslinger's vengeance, this chapter argues, suggests a rather different relationship between cultural products and legal apparatuses than that suggested by critics who portray the Western revenger as a reactionary figure. The Western gunslinger is presented here instead as a progressive figure by reading the cultural work of the Western genre as a rhetorical thinking through of a set of interconnected conflicts and inconsistencies in American legal paradigms related to justifiable homicide and gun possession.

scholarly journals Remedies to Fraud in Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Perspective / Opravné Opatrenia Pri Podvodoch S Dokumentárnymi Akreditívami: Komparatívna Perspektíva

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Hamed Alavi
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Letters Of Credit ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
American Legal System ◽  
Article 5

Abstract Article 4 of the Unified Customs and Practices of Documentary Letters of Credit establishes the notion of autonomy principle by separating credit from underlying contract between account party and beneficiary. Article 5 by recognizing the autonomy principle confirms that effectuate the payment under credit, banks only deal with documents and not with goods. As a result, while documentary letters of credit are meant to facilitate the process of international trade, their sole dependency on compliance of presented documents to bank by beneficiary to actualize the payment will increase the risk of fraud and forgery in the course of their operation. Interestingly, UCP (currently UCP600) takes a silent status regarding the problem of fraud in international LC operation and leaves the ground open for national laws to provide remedies to affected parties by fraudulent beneficiary. National Laws have different approaches to the problem of fraud in general and fraud in international LC operation in particular which makes the access of affected parties to possible remedies complicated and difficult. Current paper tries to find answer to the questions of (i) what available remedies are provided to affected parties in international LC fraud by different legal systems? (ii) And what are conditions for benefiting from such remedies under different legal systems? In achieving its objective, paper will be divided in two main parts to study remedies provided by intentional legal frameworks as well as the ones offered by national laws. Part one will study the position of UCP and UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit (UNCITRAL Convention) and remedies, which they provide to LC fraud in international trade. Part two in contrary will study available remedies to LC fraud and condition for access them under English and American legal system.

Demand-Rights, Law, and Other Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Positive Answer ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
System A

The abstract and concrete conceptions of a legal system are distinguished, and it is proposed that legal systems abstractly conceived can accord both analogues of demand-rights and demand-rights. On the concrete conception a legal system exists in a given population. Do members of the population then have demand-rights against each other to conformity with the rules of the system? The answer depends on one’s account of the existence of a legal system. A number of possible criteria of adequacy for such an account are listed, and a range of candidate accounts are sketched. Only a joint commitment account allows for a positive answer. It also satisfies all of the criteria of adequacy listed. Given that a legal system exists according to the joint commitment account, does one with a legal demand-right in that system have the corresponding demand-right period? A positive answer is defended and its implications discussed.

Kofin Al Midat S'dom: Jewish Law's Concept of Abuse of Rights

1980 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shmuel Shilo
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Jewish Law ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
System A ◽  
Legal Principle ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
The Right ◽  
Made In

The Jewish legal system's concept ofKofin al midat S'dom(kofin, in this essay) is a rule of equity whose scope of application is almost without parallel in other legal systems. Strict translation of this phrase, which is “one is compelled not to act in the manner of Sodom” is not very helpful. The rule is interpreted to mean that if A has a legal right and the infringement of such right by B will cause no loss to A but will remove some harm from, or bring a benefit to B, then the infringement of A's right will be allowed. Such a concept at once brings to mind the modern view concerning abuse of rights. There is, in fact, much in common between the two principles but they are certainly not the same. According to one legal system a certain given fact situation can have the legal principle of abuse of rights applied to it, while in another legal system a different rule of law would be resorted to. To illustrate: In certain jurisdictions the right to privacy is based on the concept of abuse of rights, while in others, as is the case in Jewish law, such a right is independent of the equivalent abuse of rights—kofin. So with other rights such as the right to light or unfair trade competition. An attempt will be made in this essay to show the range and the limits of thekofinprinciple. We will discuss those problems which are dealt with within the framework ofkofineven if their non-Jewish parallel is one which is far from the concept of abuse of rights. Conversely, we will not examine those questions which, in other legal systems, fall within the ambit of abuse of rights but are not looked upon, in Jewish law, as problems to which the rule ofkofinis to be applied, since they have been solved by other legal rules.

scholarly journals Ang lo - American Common Law and the Implementation in Vietnam

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Dang Dung ◽  
Nguyen Dang Duy
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
American Legal System

Due to characteristics of the socialist legal system, in the process of development and integration, Vietnam needs to absorb the advantages of other legal systems. The paper analyzes the features and advantages of sources of the Anglo-American legal system and lessons for Vietnam.

A Philosophical Perspective on the Regulation of Business

1998 ◽  
pp. 70-75
Author(s):  
Barbara Wendling
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Application Of Law ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
American Legal System ◽  
And Behavior

The paper compares the Anglo-American and continental legal systems in parallel with a comparison of the philosophical foundations for each. The defining philosophical distinction between the two legal traditions (viz., the Anglo-American system is predicated on idealism and the continental system on materialism) is shown to influence the way in which criminal justice is handled by the two systems as applied to citizens, and how this influence is carried across to the regulation of business as applied to corporations. The idealistic (possibly theological) worldview inherent in the Anglo-American legal system explains its moral presumptions regarding human freedom, dignity, and responsibility, while the materialist worldview inherent in the continental legal systems explains its amoral assumptions about human motivations and behavior. I suggest that while the Anglo-American legal system may be justified in its moral philosophical presumptions as applied to citizens, the continental legal system, with its amoral assumptions, more accurately reflects corporations than citizens. Understanding how the philosophy behind the two legal systems influences the application of law in modern society can lead to improvements in public policy.

Law and Authority

1989 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger A. Shiner
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Rule ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
System A ◽  
The Law ◽  
Key Terms ◽  
The Way

The nature of authority has been much debated in legal and political philosophy, and the terminology is not stable. I shall begin by stipulating how I understand some of the key terms used in this paper1. I consider authority here as a property of laws and of legal systems. Authority must be distinguished primarily from power, efficacy, and validity. Authority is not the same as power. A person or institution may have the power to affect the way that people behave, but lack authority because he, she, or it is purely coercive. Authority is not the same thing as efficacy; efficacy simply means that there is conformity to the rules of the system, whether willing conformity or not. But it is possible for there to be conformity to the laws of a successful repressive system, and such a system would not have authority. Authority is not the same as validity. To be valid is to be pedigreed by the rule of recognition of the legal system. A legal rule may have that property, and yet lack authority because it is not a rule which there is any obligation to obey. If the law has authority, then the demands that the law makes of us are such that we ought to conform to them. Theorists sometimes distinguish between “legitimate authority” and “de facto authority”. It follows from the above that in my terminology “authority” means legitimate authority as that term has been typically understood, as authority which issues directives we have an obligation to obey. “Legitimate authority” is pleonastic.

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