The Federalist Papers

The Federalist is widely considered to be one of the most influential political writings in the early United States. Consisting of eighty-five essays in total, the first seventy-seven essays were originally published in New York newspapers between October 1787 and April 1788, and the final eight appeared in the first collected edition of The Federalist in 1788, although they were later republished in New York newspapers as well. The Federalist was written collectively by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to promote the ratification of the newly drafted Constitution. In keeping with the conventions of 18th-century public political debate, The Federalist was published under the pseudonym “Publius” to present its arguments to the public in anonymous terms, focusing attention on the content of the essays rather than the personal views or personalities of the authors. Although Hamilton, Madison, and Jay would not be formally identified as the authors of The Federalist until the publication of a notice in The Port-Folio on 14 November 1807, their collective authorship was widely known by the 1790s, and their reputations as respected statesmen and innovative political thinkers brought considerable attention and credibility to their arguments. Through the voice of Publius, The Federalist explains and defends the core principles and structure of the new government outlined within the Constitution, while also identifying the flaws and weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. In doing so, The Federalist provides substantive critical and philosophical discussions of federal governance and its relationship to the principles of plural sovereignty, national unity, republican representation, citizenship, national security, commercial interests, and the separation of powers, all of which had a profound influence, not just on the ratification debates, but also on subsequent interpretations of constitutional language and authority, from the founding period to the present. While scholars have endlessly debated the political, historical, philosophical, literary, and cultural impact of The Federalist, these essays continue to serve as foundational texts for studying the politics and culture of the early United States, as well as contemporary interpretations and revisions of constitutional principles in legal, legislative, and cultural spheres.

The Axiological and Praxeological Relationship Between Political Islam and Liberal Democracy

The question of the correlation between Islam, political Islam, and liberal democracy has so far been the most exposed topic in exploring the democratic capacity of political Islam and Islamic societies in general. What is particularly intriguing about the relationship between political Islam and liberal democracy is the fact of its Westernized triviality that has received a pejorative tone in Islamic political circles. The following chapter analyzes the relationship of political Islam to specific inherent categories of liberal democracy such as the rule of law, representative government, the separation of powers, and secularism as differentia specifica of liberal Western democratic discourse. This chapter argued how appropriate tangent or divergence is illustrated and how this is reflected in the general ideological positioning of political Islam towards the liberal democracy in the Muslim countries through an axiological and praxeological perspective.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the Separation of Powers in Federal Polity and “Wills of Nation”

The problem of this article is built around the tension between the concept of organ sovereignty and democracy theory. First of all, this vision of sovereignty fails to describe the diverse forms of popular participation in collective decision-making. It speaks very sparingly of the people as a political actor. Moreover, the concept of organ sovereignty does not provide the theoretical resources to describe the intermediary bodies in the space between the state and the individual. The tradition of liberal democracy emphasises the importance of such bodies for maintaining popular control over state. Also, the idea of organ sovereignty, by reducing all power to a single legislature, ignores the demand for self-government coming from communities located within the same state and yet united by a certain collective identity. Today, democracy theorists are turning to the concepts of federalism in order to overcome the above-mentioned limitations set by the concept of organ sovereignty. So far, however, the concepts of federalism have not been very convincing in describing the various forms of popular participation in collective decision-making. Above all, they have failed to consistently justify the existence of multiple decision-making centres within a single polity. The article argues that the model of the federal polity proposed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his later work “Considerations on the mode of government in Poland” explains how within one polity multiple centres of collective decision-making can coexist. The model also provides an understanding of how citizen participation in multiple decision-making centres can be organised.

Federalism Practice in Nepal: Does it Move in the Expected Course?

This study examines how far Nepal's current practice of federalism has progressed toward people's aspirations, based on power separation, public trust, power equalization, and intergovernmental relationships. Primary data was collected on purposively 72 key informant interviews, which were then triangulated by the KII response. Finding demonstrates that functions and authorities were devolved in accordance with the principle of separation of powers at all three levels of government. However, the constitutional provisions were completely disregarded, and power was centralized by an unholy alliance of political leadership and bureaucracy. Second, people expected the democratic government to take a welfare approach to ensure greater pluralism and alliances, but special interests of politicians for their election constituencies, as well as identity-based issues, caused havoc in the effective operation of federalism. Third, the provision of three tiers of power-sharing mechanisms was based on coexistence, cooperation, and coordination. However, the federal government appears hesitant to support sub-national governments due to the centralized mindset of bureaucrats and politicians. Fourth, the constitution has focused on intergovernmental relations, but such relationships fail due to imbalances in vertical and horizontal relationships, fiscal dependency, and the bureaucracy's power-seeking attitude. In the end, two key questions for the discussions are raised. First, the institutionalization of accountability at the local level is it a true commitment, or is it merely an ivory tower? Second, the provision of autonomy has been used as a means of transformation or simply as a bargaining tool at the local level?

The Constitutional and Legal Organization of the Supreme Constitutional Court in the Iraqi State for the Year 2005

The constitutional system in Iraq after the overthrow of the previous regime in 2003 witnessed major fundamental changes, which marked the end of a historical era, the advent of the beginning of a new phase of political and constitutional history, and the adoption of the federal (federal) system as a form of the new Iraqi state, where Iraq transformed from a simple state to a complex state. With the adoption of the democratic parliamentary system based on the principle of separation of powers and respect for the constitution by emphasizing the principle of the supremacy of the constitution as a system for the work of state authorities and the management of its various constitutional institutions. If the constitutional distribution of competencies between the federal authorities is one of the essential characteristics of the federal systems, then one of the important features in the design of any federalism and its effective operation is to ensure the rule of law and the constitution as the source of powers, and in contrast, one of the authorities infringes on the powers of the other, which leads to a constitutional imbalance in the federalism And the matter that leads to its disintegration and its end, and in order to preserve this constitutional system, it is necessary to establish a supreme judicial body to ensure respect for the application of the constitutional principles of this system and not to be violated. The federal system is characterized by the presence of a Supreme Constitutional Court that works to monitor the constitutionality of laws and chapters In disputes between the central regions, it has the authority to interpret the Iraqi federal constitution, especially the interpretation of the constitutional rules related to the distribution of constitutional powers between the regions and the federal government. Which is one of the thorny issues in the countries of the union, and on this basis in Iraq the foregoing was the establishment of the Federal Supreme Court, which was granted by the constitution judicial and political competencies in order to exercise its role in preserving the union and the balance of powers within it while preserving the constitution and safeguarding its principles.

1. Why EU institutions matter:

The European Union (EU) cannot be understood without reference to its institutions. But scholars differ on the questions of what precisely EU institutions are, what they do, and why they matter. This chapter defines EU institutions as decision-making bodies. It refers to the notion of EU institutional politics as the sphere of informal and formal rules, norms, procedures, and practices that shape such decision-making. The chapter explores how different theoretical traditions—international relations, integration theory, new institutionalism, the separation of powers, governance, public policy and administration approaches, and critical perspectives—think about EU institutions. Drawing on these traditions, this chapter encourages readers to think about EU institutions along five dimensions: intergovernmental versus supranational, international versus transnational, separated versus fused power, leaders versus followers, and contested versus legitimate. Seeing how the Union’s decision-making bodies move within and between these dimensions offers a deeper understanding of why EU institutions matter.

4. The Council of the European Union:

The Council is an institution of day-to-day policymaking in which the interests of member state governments are represented by cabinet ministers who meet, according to their policy portfolio, in different Council configurations and within the Eurogroup. According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council has a dual mandate. It acts as a legislative organ as well as an executive and policy-coordinating institution. This dual role is reflected in the organization and meeting practices of the different Council configurations. Those groupings of ministers dealing primarily with executive decisions and policy coordination tend to meet more often and are regarded as being more senior than those formations of the Council which engage predominantly in legislative decision-making. As a legislative institution, the Council has increasingly acquired features of an upper chamber in a bicameral separation of powers system, working in tandem with the European Parliament. In contrast, Council decision-making relating to executive issues and policy coordination in important policy domains, such as economic governance and foreign policy, is closely aligned with the European Council. In these areas, the Council can be considered to constitute, together with the Commission, a collective EU executive.