On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 415-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Doghmi ◽  
Abderrahmane Ziad
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Private Good ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Game Form ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
All Solutions ◽  
Restricted Domains ◽  
No Veto Power

AbstractIn this article, we study the problem of Nash implementation in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped preferences in the presence of at least one minimally honest agent. We prove that all solutions of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria as long as there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism (game form). To justify this result, we provide a list of solutions which violate the condition of no-veto power.

A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Makoto Hagiwara
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Allocation Problem ◽  
Game Form ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
Infinitely Divisible ◽  
Fair Game ◽  
Game Forms

AbstractWe consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (Games and Economic Behavior, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.

Nash implementation without no-veto power

2008 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Benoît ◽  
Efe A. Ok
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
No Veto Power

Oscillation and Global Attractivity in a Periodic Delay Equation

1996 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Graef ◽  
C. Qian ◽  
P. W. Spikes
Keyword(s):  
Global Attractivity ◽  
Positive Periodic Solution ◽  
Continuous Functions ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
All Solutions ◽  
Periodic Delay ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Delay Differential ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

AbstractConsider the delay differential equationwhere α(t) and β(t) are positive, periodic, and continuous functions with period w > 0, and m is a nonnegative integer. We show that this equation has a positive periodic solution x*(t) with period w. We also establish a necessary and sufficient condition for every solution of the equation to oscillate about x*(t) and a sufficient condition for x*(t) to be a global attractor of all solutions of the equation.

scholarly journals Iterative criteria for bounds on the growth of positive solutions of a delay differential equation

1978 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-200
Author(s):  
Raymond D. Terry
Keyword(s):  
Differential Equation ◽  
Positive Solutions ◽  
Delay Differential Equation ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
All Solutions ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Delay Differential

AbstractFollowing Terry (Pacific J. Math. 52 (1974), 269–282), the positive solutions of eauqtion (E): are classified according to types Bj. We denote A neccessary condition is given for a Bk-solution y(t) of (E) to satisfy y2k(t) ≥ m(t) > 0. In the case m(t) = C > 0, we obtain a sufficient condition for all solutions of (E) to be oscillatory.

COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 253-261
Author(s):  
RYUSUKE SHINOHARA
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Aggregative Games ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Coalition Proof

The relationship between coalition-proof (Nash) equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. In this paper, focusing on a class of aggregative games, we provide a sufficient condition for the aggregative game under which every coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is also coalition-proof in the original normal-form game. The stringency of the sufficient condition means that a coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is rarely a coalition-proof equilibrium in the whole game.

scholarly journals Nash implementation with a private good

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Duggan
Keyword(s):  
Private Good ◽  
Nash Implementation

scholarly journals UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS

1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 267-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
WALTER TROCKEL
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Bargaining Games ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
Bargaining Solutions

The paper presents a method of supporting certain solutions of two-person bargaining games by unique Nash equilibria of associated games in strategic form. Among the supported solutions is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

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