scholarly journals UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS

1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 267-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
WALTER TROCKEL
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Bargaining Games ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
Bargaining Solutions

The paper presents a method of supporting certain solutions of two-person bargaining games by unique Nash equilibria of associated games in strategic form. Among the supported solutions is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Makoto Hagiwara
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Allocation Problem ◽  
Game Form ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
Infinitely Divisible ◽  
Fair Game ◽  
Game Forms

AbstractWe consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (Games and Economic Behavior, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.

scholarly journals Nash Equilibria and Bargaining Solutions of Differential Bilinear Games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Calà Campana ◽  
Gabriele Ciaramella ◽  
Alfio Borzì
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Bargaining Solutions

On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 415-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Doghmi ◽  
Abderrahmane Ziad
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Private Good ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Game Form ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
All Solutions ◽  
Restricted Domains ◽  
No Veto Power

AbstractIn this article, we study the problem of Nash implementation in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped preferences in the presence of at least one minimally honest agent. We prove that all solutions of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria as long as there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism (game form). To justify this result, we provide a list of solutions which violate the condition of no-veto power.

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

Berge and Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (11) ◽  
pp. 2108-2131
Author(s):  
V. I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
A. S. Gorbatov ◽  
K. N. Kudryavtsev
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Quadratic Differential ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Linear Quadratic
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