Der Flussname Inn, Ockhams Rasiermesser und moderne Indogermanistik

Harald Bichlmeier

doi:10.1515/zcph-2021-0003

Der Flussname Inn, Ockhams Rasiermesser und moderne Indogermanistik

Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie ◽

10.1515/zcph-2021-0003 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 86 (1) ◽

pp. 15-38

Author(s):

Harald Bichlmeier

Keyword(s):

The Other ◽

European Language ◽

Standing Water ◽

Occam’S Razor ◽

Occam's Razor

Abstract Some European hydronyms (among them also the river-name Inn) have sometimes been explained based on a root PIE “ *en‑/*on‑” (modern spelling: PIE *h₁en(H)-), which has usually been given the meaning ‘flow, river’ vel sim. This root cannot even be found in Pokorny’s Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch (1959). No real proof for that root has been found in the appellative lexicon of any Indo-European language. Moreover, there aren’t any sure continuations of that root in the onymic lexicons of those languages. All names put forward as arguments can either be explained based on a root PIE *pen-/*pon- ‘swamp, (standing) water’ (because they are Celtic) or based on a root PIE *h₂en- ‘haul (water)’. As long as no proof of an appellative use of a root PIE *h₁en(H)- can be offered, which alone might tell us, what that root actually meant, the application of ‘Occam’s razor’ leaves us no other choice but to explain all regarding names from the other two roots.

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Ontological commitment

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ◽

10.4324/9780415249126-x027-1 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Michael Jubien

Keyword(s):

Ontological Commitment ◽

Comparative Assessment ◽

Philosophical Problem ◽

The Other ◽

General Question ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Central Figure ◽

Occam’S Razor ◽

The One ◽

Occam's Razor

A person may believe in the existence of God, or numbers or ghosts. Such beliefs may be asserted, perhaps in a theory. Assertions of the existence of specific entities or kinds of entities are the intuitive source of the notion of ontological commitment, for it is natural to think of a person who makes such an assertion as being ‘committed’ to an ‘ontology’ that includes such entities. So ontological commitment appears to be a relation that holds between persons or existence assertions (including theories), on the one hand, and specific entities or kinds of entities (or ontologies), on the other. Ontological commitment is thus a very rich notion – one in which logical, metaphysical, linguistic and epistemic elements are intermingled. The main philosophical problem concerning commitment is whether there is a precise criterion for detecting commitments in accordance with intuition. It once seemed extremely important to find a criterion, for it promised to serve as a vital tool in the comparative assessment of theories. Many different criteria have been proposed and a variety of problems have beset these efforts. W.V. Quine has been the central figure in the discussion and we will consider two of his formulations below. Many important philosophical topics are closely connected with ontological commitment. These include: the nature of theories and their interpretation; interpretations of quantification; the nature of kinds; the question of the existence of merely possible entities; extensionality and intensionality; the general question of the nature of modality; and the significance of Occam’s razor.

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On the cohomology of certain subspaces of $$\text {Sym}^n(\mathbb {P}^1)$$ and Occam’s razor for Hodge structures

Research in the Mathematical Sciences ◽

10.1007/s40687-021-00261-8 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Oishee Banerjee

Keyword(s):

Zeta Functions ◽

The Other ◽

Grothendieck Ring ◽

Hodge Structures ◽

Symmetric Powers ◽

Link Type ◽

Occam’S Razor ◽

Motivic Zeta Functions ◽

Occam's Razor

AbstractVakil and Matchett-Wood (Discriminants in the Grothendieck ring of varieties, 2013. arXiv:1208.3166) made several conjectures on the topology of symmetric powers of geometrically irreducible varieties based on their computations on motivic zeta functions. Two of those conjectures are about subspaces of $$\text {Sym}^n(\mathbb {P}^1)$$ Sym n ( P 1 ) . In this note, we disprove one of them and prove a stronger form of the other, thereby obtaining (counter)examples to the principle of Occam’s razor for Hodge structures.

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Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism ◽

10.1163/22105700-05011168 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 6 (1) ◽

pp. 1-29 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Mark Walker

Keyword(s):

Common Sense ◽

External World ◽

The Other ◽

Common Sense View ◽

Other Hand ◽

Occam’S Razor ◽

The Common ◽

The One ◽

Occam's Razor

Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives and so has more to recommend it, evidentially speaking. This dispute has overshadowed another possible view: skeptical dogmatism. Skeptical dogmatists hold that we are justified in believing that the common sense view is probably false. I argue that skeptical dogmatism presents some interesting complications to the dialectic between the dogmatist and the skeptic. On the one hand, even if the dogmatist’s use of Occam’s razor is sufficient to rebut skepticism, in itself it is not sufficient to refute skeptical dogmatism. On the other hand, skeptics themselves, ironically, must, given the assumptions of the paper, appeal to something like Occam’s razor in order to avoid capitulating to skeptical dogmatism.

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Plato's Quinean Beard: Did Plato ever grow it?

Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s003181919700003x ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 73 (1) ◽

pp. 113-121 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

MICHAEL DURRANT

Keyword(s):

The Other ◽

Empty Names ◽

Other Hand ◽

Occam’S Razor ◽

Occam's Razor

Quine may be taken to use the phrase ‘Plato's Beard’ to denote a solution to the following problem: How is it possible to speak of that which does not exist, of non-being or as Read has it, to denote a solution to the problem: ‘How can a sentence with empty names have meaning?’.Quine writes:Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato's beard; historically it has proved tough, frequently dulling the edge of Occam's razor.To expand. If nonbeing in no sense is, then we cannot ever assert that it is not; yet if it in some sense is, then how can it remain nonbeing? Let us fill out with an example (coined from Quine). If Pegasus in no sense exists, then how can we ever assert that Pegasus does not exist?—yet we may clearly want to assert that Pegasus does not exist and affirm the proposition that it is false that Pegasus exists. If, on the other hand, Pegasus in some sense exists, how may we affirm that he does not? We shall be contradicting ourselves or be guilty of equivocation.

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