Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Walker
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Sense View ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Occam’S Razor ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Occam's Razor

Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives and so has more to recommend it, evidentially speaking. This dispute has overshadowed another possible view: skeptical dogmatism. Skeptical dogmatists hold that we are justified in believing that the common sense view is probably false. I argue that skeptical dogmatism presents some interesting complications to the dialectic between the dogmatist and the skeptic. On the one hand, even if the dogmatist’s use of Occam’s razor is sufficient to rebut skepticism, in itself it is not sufficient to refute skeptical dogmatism. On the other hand, skeptics themselves, ironically, must, given the assumptions of the paper, appeal to something like Occam’s razor in order to avoid capitulating to skeptical dogmatism.

The Promoting and the Financing of the Suez Canal

1956 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Baer
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
World History ◽  
Suez Canal ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Professional Fields

This timely account of the hunching of the Suez Canal project reveals both sides of the coin of innovation. It is, on the one hand, a study of the character and methods of one of the most famous innovators of the nineteenth century. Ferdinand DeLesseps was not a politician, a financier, an engineer, a promoter (in the common sense of the word), or a businessman. Yet he succeeded brilliantly in a venture requiring consummate mastery of all these professional fields. On the other hand is revealed the waterway itself — vital to one civilization, useless and neglected in another, and then of transcendent importance as world history marched on. Realization of the grand scheme envisaged by the Pharaohs came at last when economic and political factors momentarily aligned in a pattern of opportunity for a unique set of entrepreneurial qualifications.

The Rubicon of Language

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Lecourt
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Racial Identities ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Max Müller ◽  
The Common ◽  
Human Capacity ◽  
The One ◽  
Religious Differences

This chapter considers a series of formative debates in British anthropology from the 1840s through the 1860s and uses them to map out the two dominant constructions of religion whose politics the subsequent authors in this study would reinvent. It describes, on the one hand, a liberal and evangelical construction of religion as the common human capacity for spiritual cultivation, and on the other hand a conservative, reactionary model that interpreted religious differences as the expressions of fixed racial identities that neither civilization nor Christianization could erase. In the work of the Oxford philologist F. Max Müller we see how the former model tended to associate religion above all with language. But we can also see the subtle forms of determinism that it contained—an ambiguity that Arnold, Pater, Eliot, and Lang would explore by picturing racialized religion as a resource for liberal self-cultivation.

scholarly journals A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Evidential Basis ◽  
Apparent Conflict

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.

scholarly journals Rethinking Hijab in Contemporary Indonesia: A Study of Hijab Community “Tuneeca Lover Community”

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-221
Author(s):  
Wardah Nuroniyah
Keyword(s):  
Social Class ◽  
Qualitative Method ◽  
Public Domain ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Public ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Veil ◽  
The One ◽  
Common Perception

Hijab (veil) for female Muslims has been subject to a debate regarding its meanings. On the one hand, it represents the virtue of religious obedience and piety. Still, on the other hand, it is associated with the form of women oppressions in the public domain. At this point, the hijab has been an arena of contesting interpretations. Meanwhile, contemporary Indonesia is witnessing the increase in the use of veil among urban female Muslims that leads to the birth of various hijab wearer communities. One of them is Tuneeca Lover Community (TLC). This community has become a new sphere where female Muslims articulate their ideas about Islam through various activities such as religious gathering, hijab tutorial class, fashion show, and charity activities. This study seeks to answer several questions: Why do these women decide to wear a hijab? Why do they join the TLC? How do they perceive the veil? Is it related to religious doctrines or other factors such as lifestyle? This research employs a qualitative method using documentation and interview to gather the data among 150 members of the TLC.  This research shows that their understanding of the hijab results from the common perception that places the veil as a religious obligation. Nevertheless, each of the members has one's orientation over the hijab. This paper also suggests that they try to transform this understanding into modern settings. As a consequence, they are not only committed to the traditionally spiritual meaning of the hijab but are also nuanced with modern ideas such as lifestyle and particular social class. Their participation in the TLC enables them to reach both goals simultaneously.

Herbert Mac Cabe’s Philosophical Anthropology

Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Anthropology ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Language System ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Individual Human

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.

Ontological commitment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Jubien
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Comparative Assessment ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Question ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
Occam’S Razor ◽  
The One ◽  
Occam's Razor

A person may believe in the existence of God, or numbers or ghosts. Such beliefs may be asserted, perhaps in a theory. Assertions of the existence of specific entities or kinds of entities are the intuitive source of the notion of ontological commitment, for it is natural to think of a person who makes such an assertion as being ‘committed’ to an ‘ontology’ that includes such entities. So ontological commitment appears to be a relation that holds between persons or existence assertions (including theories), on the one hand, and specific entities or kinds of entities (or ontologies), on the other. Ontological commitment is thus a very rich notion – one in which logical, metaphysical, linguistic and epistemic elements are intermingled. The main philosophical problem concerning commitment is whether there is a precise criterion for detecting commitments in accordance with intuition. It once seemed extremely important to find a criterion, for it promised to serve as a vital tool in the comparative assessment of theories. Many different criteria have been proposed and a variety of problems have beset these efforts. W.V. Quine has been the central figure in the discussion and we will consider two of his formulations below. Many important philosophical topics are closely connected with ontological commitment. These include: the nature of theories and their interpretation; interpretations of quantification; the nature of kinds; the question of the existence of merely possible entities; extensionality and intensionality; the general question of the nature of modality; and the significance of Occam’s razor.

scholarly journals Metrical Positions and their Linguistic Realisations in Old Germanic Metres: A Typological Overview

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seiichi Suzuki
Keyword(s):  
Old English ◽  
The Other ◽  
Old Norse ◽  
Old Saxon ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Common Scale ◽  
The Common ◽  
Linguistic Alignment ◽  
The One ◽  
Linguistic Material

This paper provides a typological account of Old Germanic metre by investigating its parametric variations that largely determine the metrical identities of the Old English Beowulf, the Old Saxon Heliand, and Old Norse eddic poetry (composed in fornyrðislag, málaháttr, or ljóðaháttr). The primary parameters to be explored here are the principle of four metrical positions per verse and the differing ways in which these constituent positions are aligned to linguistic material. On the one hand, the four-position principle works with a maximal strictness in Beowulf, and to a slightly lesser extent in fornyrðislag, whereas it allows for a wider range of deviations in verse size in the Heliand and ljóðaháttr. In málaháttr, however, the principle in itself gives way to the five-position counterpart. On the other hand, the variation in the metrical– linguistic alignment in the three close cognate metres may be generalised by positing the common scale, Heliand > Beowulf > fornyrðislag, for the decreasing likelihood of resolution, the increasing likelihood of suspending resolution, and the decreasing size of the drop.

The Letter of Recommendation as Strange Work

PMLA ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 127 (4) ◽  
pp. 954-962
Author(s):  
Margaret Ferguson
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Free Lunch ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Gift ◽  
English Major ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Gift Certificate ◽  
Time And Energy ◽  
Made In

On the one hand, the gift presents itself as a radical Other of the commodity—and therefore also of work, insofar as the latter is understood as an investment of time and energy made in the expectation of wages or profit. On the other hand, the idea of the gift seems constantly to be drawn back under the horizon of rational exchange, and to be thus endlessly re-revealed as a secret ally of both work and the Work.—Scott Cutler Shershow, The Work and the GiftI have put together all these details to convince you that this recommendation of mine is something out of the common.Quae ego omnia collegi, ut intellegeres non vulgarem esse commendationem hanc meam.—Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares, book 13LAST FALL I FOUND IN MY OFFICE MAILBOX AN ENVELOPE FROM A SOPHOMORE ENGLISH MAJOR WHO HAD ASKED ME DURING THE SUMMER for a last-minute letter of recommendation for a scholarship competition. The envelope contained a handwritten thank-you note—and a gift certificate for a local restaurant. I e-mailed the student to thank her and to tell her that I couldn't accept the gift certificate since the letter I had written for her was part of my job as a teacher. She insisted; I insisted. She said that several teachers had turned her down before I agreed (from a hotel in Germany) to write for her. I felt rueful, as well as grateful to her for the token of gratitude that I couldn't accept. Eventually she won the debate: I accepted the printed piece of paper and took my daughters out to a free lunch.

Religion's ‘Foundation in Reason’: The Common Sense of Hume's Natural History

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-581
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Rational Argument ◽  
Regular Model ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Forceful Critique ◽  
Critique Of Religion

David Hume’s critique of religion reveals what seems to be a vacillation in his commitment to an argument-based paradigm of legitimate believing. On the one hand, Hume assumes such a traditional (argumentbased) model of rational justification of beliefs in order to point to the weakness of some classical arguments for religious belief (e.g., the design argument), to chastise the believer for extrapolating to a conclusion which outstrips its evidential warrant. On the other hand, Hume, ‘mitigated’ or naturalist skeptic that he is, at other times rejects an argumentbased paradigm of certainty and truth, and so sees as irrelevant the traditional or ‘regular’ model of rational justification; he places a premium on instinctive belief, as both unavoidable and (usually) more reliable than reasoning. On this view, a forceful critique of religion would have to fault it, not for failing to meet criteria of rational argument (failing to proportion belief to the evidence), but (as Hume sometimes seems to) for failing to be the right sort of instinct.

scholarly journals Immigration, Humanity, and Morality

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sunday Adeniyi Fasoro
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
Vulnerable People ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One

AbstractThe trend toward the concept of humanity in political theory has arisen largely as a reaction against the mistreatment of vulnerable people such as immigrants. The issue of immigrants’ vulnerability has led political thinkers to ponder on how to apply the principle of humanity to the question of the treatment of immigrants. I would like to address this matter by examining two questions: what is humanity, is it a value property, or a virtue? Does it really matter if the means by which an immigrant immigrates is demeaning to his own humanity as a person? The most common or intuitive reply to these questions would probably be: ‘humanity’ is simply a value-bestowing property, so regardless of immigrants’ actions they are owed respectful treatment. The aim of this paper is to emphasise instead that ‘humanity’ should be conceived as a virtue of actual commitment to act on moral principles. I explore three different meanings of humanity. First, I discuss ‘humanity’ as the common ownership of the earth. Second, I discuss ‘humanity’ as a value property. Third, I discuss humanity as a virtue of acting, on the one hand, with humanity, and on the other hand, on moral principles.

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