The Things We Do with Empty Names

This chapter undertakes to apply the previously developed theory of objective representational content to our thought and talk about apparently non-existent objects. It aims to show that we need not construe the referents of singular terms within fiction and within mathematics as possessing bona fide existence (or non-existence) while also providing a robust understanding of our singular representations when we think with such terms. The arguments depend on the trio of distinctions between merely objectual and fully objective linguistic and mental representations; non-veridical and veridical language games; and truth-similitude and literal truth. With these distinctions, the chapter exhibits the explanatory power of a theory on which empty singular terms are merely objectual yet are fundamental to our non-veridical language and thought games, possessing truth-similitude while falling short of literal truth.

Empty Names, Presupposition Failure, and Metalinguistic Negation

When it comes to empty names, we seem to have reached very little consensus. Still, we all seem to agree, first, that our semantics should assign truth to (one reading of) negative singular existence statements in which an empty name occurs and, second, that names are used in such statements. The purpose of this paper is to show that ruling out that the names are mentioned is harder than it has been thought. I will present a new metalinguistic account for negative singular existence statements in which an empty name occurs, and I will show that the account can deal both with the objections to the traditional metalinguistic account and with other objections that seem to target my new proposal.

Reden über etwas

The concept of something runs like a red thread through Husserl's explanations of the phenomenological theory of intentionality. "Something" is what we mean even when we use fictional and contradictory expressions. In the words of Emile Benveniste, how can this "something" be demarcated from language? In the search for a linguistically adequate understanding of this concept, topics as diverse as Augustine's theory of language, Franz Bopp's comparative grammar, text linguistics, or Heidegger's reading of the modistic treatise are treated within the framework of comparative studies. It is, as the phenomenological analysis of empty names or inner monologue shows, in particular situations of speaking that the concept of something and thus the meaning-bearing function of linguistic expressions comes into consciousness.

Parmenides on ‘naming’ and ‘meaning’: a disjunctivist reading of the Poem

A well-established tradition has argued that it is not legitimate to attribute to Parmenides a Fregean semantics, i.e. the distinction between ‘naming’ and ‘meaning’. Nonetheless, Parmenides claims more than once (B 8.53, B 9.1) that mortals do name reality, although incorrectly. As many scholars have emphasised, because it is fair neither to conclude that mortals’ names are ‘empty names’ nor dismiss Opinion's account (i.e., broadly speaking, the mortals’ account of reality) itself as meaningless, it seems that Parmenides is suggesting that some kind of distinction between what names refer to and what names mean must be drawn. In view of this, what is Parmenides’ account of names? My suggestion is that in order to explain the Eleatic philosophy of language (and the Eleatic account of names) a step back is required. More specifically, Parmenides’ epistemology has to be taken into account. Indeed, if we assume that Parmenides is arguing for an ‘epistemological disjunctivism’ – such that the veridical and truthful state and the erroneous and deceptive state are essentially different – it will be clear that he is further arguing for what could be defined as a ‘semantic disjunctivism’, so that true speech and false speech are essentially different as well.

Empty Names and Negative Existentials

Empty Names and Negative Existentials

The Sign of Four

Chapter 2 lays down the general traits of the Radical Fictionalist analysis of fiction, focusing on the case of homodiegetic narrative. In particular, this chapter stresses the distinction between empty names and fictional names, it explains the role of impartations in fictional discourse, and it motivates the primacy of fictional tellers for a Radical Fictionalist take on fiction. Radical Fictionalism is then compared with some alternative views on the semantics of fictional discourse, with particular attention to Pragmatic Millianism and to theories of semantic ascent. The final sections pause on the Radical Fictionalist approach to speech acts in fiction, and they criticize the idea of a dedicated illocutionary force of fiction-making.

Preliminaries

Chapter 1 puts forth some preliminary considerations about our actual (that is, not fictional) use of language. In particular, it motivates the relevance of singular terms for the Radical Fictionalist approach to fiction, it sketches a picture of the semantics of proper names, and it discusses the ideas of empty names and gappy propositions. This chapter also explains some of the terminology employed in what follows, in particular the distinction between fully-fledged expressions (such as proper names) and expression-types (such as mere name-types). The final section focuses on the contentful effects achieved by the use of language and introduces the idea of impartation, one of the central concepts in the Radical Fictionalist approach to fiction.