Notes on Free-Associative Listening: “I Am Also a Stranger Here”

2021 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-275
Author(s):  
Barnaby B. Barratt

The unique conditions and characteristics of listening in psychoanalysis are introduced in relation to an effort to define how psychoanalysis proceeds “beyond psychotherapy.” Using an example from Freud's self-analysis, the author explores the tenet that every psychoanalytic session is to be treated like a dream. Freud's prescriptions for the method of listening psychoanalytically are critically discussed and the idea of “listening-to-listen” is introduced, as contrasted with listening in order to hear, listening-to-understand or in order to interpret. It is argued that free-associative listening is distinctive as a processive momentum that deconstructively interrogates the practitioner's own mechanisms of suppression and repression. This process fosters an awareness of that which is otherwise than representation, that which cannot be captured within the purview of reflective consciousness. In this sense, healing is not only transformative, but also transmutative, and the psychoanalyst is one for whom nothing is alien and everything is strange.

Dialogue ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-756
Author(s):  
Kathleen Wider

The central tenet in the ontology Sartre describes and seeks to defend in Being and Nothingness is that being divides into the for-itself and the in-itself. Self-consciousness characterizes being-for-itself and distinguishes it from being-in-itself. What it means for a being to exist for itself is that it is self-conscious. How Sartre characterizes self-consciousness in Being and Nothingness is, however, a question that remains to be asked. There is no simple answer to this question. For Sartre, there are really several levels of self-consciousness: the self-consciousness of consciousness at the pre-reflective level, at the level of reflection (both pure and impure) and at the level of being-for-others. There is a profound difference between the self-consciousness of being-for-others and impure reflection, on the one hand, and the self-consciousness of reflection and pre-reflective consciousness, on the other. With being-for-others and impure reflection, self-consciousness involves the attempt to grasp the self as an object for consciousness. Although the nature of this attempt and the reasons for its ultimate failure differ at each level, these levels are bound together by a common sense of self-consciousness as a consciousness of the self as an object.


Author(s):  
Ingvar Johansson

Some kinds of utterances which have an indicative grammatical form seem, for different reasons, to be unable to say something true of the world. Logical contradictions are only the prime example of something the author baptizes impossible descriptions. So-called performative contradictions (e.g., "I do not exist") make up another kind, but there are at least two more such kinds: negating affirmations and performatives which cannot be explained within the philosophy of language. Only philosophical anthropology can explain their feature of "impossibleness," and a distinction between unreflective and reflective consciousness is central to the explanation. Particularly important here is G. H. Mead's distinction between two aspects of the self: the "I" and the "me." Each of the four kinds of impossible descriptions distinguished has its own contrary opposite. These are, in turn, logical tautologies, performative tautologies, affirming negations, and omissive performatives. The last three types as types have not received the philosophical recognition that they deserve. All four fit a general characterization which is given as a definition of the concept of superfluous description.


Author(s):  
Iain Hamilton Grant

Andrew Bowie's recent Schelling and Modern European Philosophy claims that Schelling idealism is a critique of 'reflective reason' that can be brought to bear on the avatars of French postmodernism. Bower is careful not to intricate Schelling's Naturphilosophie and Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, in which both nature and freedom are fused into a single, unconscious series of natural drives or 'vortex of forces.' To take Schelling at word would turn the Naturphilosophie and Inquiries into a materialist physics of mental states, the basis of which are inaccessible to reflective consciousness. Best represented by philosophers such as Paul Churchland, however, why does Bowie avoid playing up this materialist Schelling when dealing with French 'Irrationalism?' Inadvertently, Bowie rekindles the Kantian critique in order to separate two aspects of recent French philosophy: the materialist (with which Paul Churchland notes that his eliminative, connectionist neuromaterialism has much in common) and the reflective (as inherited from the German Idealism Schelling represents, and mediated via Bergson and Heidegger). While French philosophy's recent adoptions in the Anglo world have been of this latter complexion, Bowie's anxious prophylaxia exposes a materialist current in French thought that has remained more or less beyond the range of Anglophone hearing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 1195
Author(s):  
Ling Wang

Reflection plays an effective role in promoting teachers’ professional growth and improving teachers’ overall quality. As for Pre-service teachers, teaching practice is an indispensable period for their professional development. Therefore, reflective consciousness and ability should be trained in their practicum. This paper fully elaborates the importance of reflective consciousness for middle school pre-service teachers in the practicum from the contents of the pre-service teachers’ teaching reflection: classroom teaching, student study, teacher-student interaction, teachers’ development and education environment. From the research ,we find pre-service teacher often reflect on classroom teaching, student study and teacher-student interaction. The other two parts are usually neglected.


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