Jury Trial in Austria

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-325
Author(s):  
Greg Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Jury Trial ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Inquisitorial System

Austria has had a system of jury trial, with some interruptions, since 1848. Although Austrian jury trial was derived from England via France, little is known about it in the common law world. This article commences with an overview of the history of jury trial in Austria and of the constitutional protection it currently enjoys. Then the major differences between Austrian jury trial and the common law's model of jury trial are analyzed, and the system of appeals is described. It will be seen that much of trial practice and the appeals system is either an attempt to adapt a transplanted institution to the inquisitorial system and/or a result of the “Austrofascist” dictatorship's so-called reforms of 1933–1934. Austrian jury trial has not fared well in the inquisitorial environment, a state of affairs that does not result from any fundamental incompatibility between the inquisitorial system and jury trial but rather from a lack of enthusiasm for jury trial among the Austrian legal elite.

A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit

1977 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 373
Author(s):  
J. L. Barton ◽  
A. W. B. Simpson ◽  
S. J. Stoljar
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common

New Light on Slade's Case

1971 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Baker
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Full Report ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
Almost All

Slade's Case is of such significance in the history of the common law that it has, quite properly, been the subject of more scrutiny and discussion in recent years than any other case of the same age. The foundation of all this discussion has been Coke's report, which is the only full report in print. The accuracy and completeness of Coke's version have hardly been challenged, and the discussions have assumed that it contains almost all there is to know about the case. This assumption must be discarded if we are to understand the contemporary significance of the case.

Law Making

2019 ◽  
pp. 206-238
Author(s):  
John Baker
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Symbiotic Relationship ◽  
Legal Change ◽  
Inns Of Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Learning ◽  
Law Making

This chapter examines the history of case-law, legislation, and equity, with particular reference to legal change. The common law was evidenced by judicial precedent, but single decisions were not binding until the nineteenth century. It was also rooted in professional understanding, the ‘common learning’ acquired in the inns of court. It was based on ‘reason’, operating within a rigid procedural framework. Legal change could be effected by fictions, equity, and legislation, but (except during the Interregnum) there was little systematic reform before the nineteenth century. Legislation was external to the common law, but it had to be interpreted by common-law judges and so there was a symbiotic relationship between statute-law and case-law. Codification has sometimes been proposed, but with limited effect.

The History, Justification, and Purpose of Mental Health Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 34-52
Author(s):  
Kay Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Health Problems ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Health Problems ◽  
Systemic Reform ◽  
Health Law ◽  
Mental Health Law ◽  
Incremental Change ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common

Chapter 2 examines the historical development of mental health law in England (which is similar to the rest of the common law world, including America, Canada, and Australia) and uses that history to consider the justification, purpose, and need for mental health law from Ancient Greece to the present. Contrary to the claims of abolitionists that mental health law has essentially always stayed the same, it demonstrates a history of continuous legal and systemic reform in mental health law. Rather than an over-zealous and interfering state keen to exercise social control over persons with mental impairment, it instead depicts a state which for the most part reluctantly only became involved in the care of persons with mental health problems when informal care by family and friends failed or was non-existent, to prevent abuses by private operators, and as an incident of its administration of the criminal law. When set against the background of the fashions, cycles, and recurring themes of mental health law, the call of abolition can be conceptualized as simply the latest fad in its evolution. Further, many of the issues which arise from mental health problems will continue to exist even without mental health law. Mental health law can be positive and negative, including defining and protecting rights and allocating resources. The chapter cautions against being too optimistic about the promises of sweeping revolutionary changes which have never really delivered (deinstitutionalization or the ‘abolition’ of the asylum being the most poignant example), in favour of solid incremental change.

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