‘Within or outside Canada’: The Charter’s application to the extraterritorial activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Since the swift passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2015, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has had the unprecedented and highly controversial authority to take ‘reasonable and proportionate’ measures to reduce threats to Canadian security. While there are some limits to the types of measures CSIS can employ, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act permits the use of measures that would otherwise contravene the laws of Canada or limit a right protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms so long as they are judicially authorized by the Federal Court. As new threats proliferate around the world, it is anticipated that CSIS will increasingly carry out this mandate overseas. Yet review bodies tasked with monitoring CSIS’s use of threat reduction measures (TRMs) report that CSIS has never sought judicial authorization to conduct a TRM. Why? One answer may be that CSIS has concluded that the Charter does not govern actions carried out abroad, and, as such, their extraterritorial conduct falls beyond the reach and oversight of the Federal Court. Whether the Charter applies to CSIS’s overseas conduct ostensibly lies in the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading case on the extraterritorial application of the Charter, R. v Hape. This article canvasses domestic and international law, as well as intelligence law theory, to explain why that presumption is wrong. Wrong, not least because the majority opinion in Hape is deeply flawed in its analysis and application of international law. But also, because intelligence operations are so distinguishable from the transnational criminal investigations at issue in Hape, the Court’s findings are inapplicable in the former context. In short, this article demonstrates that applying Hape to the actions of CSIS officers not only leaves their actions beyond the scrutiny of Canadian courts but also creates a significant human rights gap.

Private liability without wrongdoing

Rights-based theories of private law tend to be wrongs based and defendant focused. But many private law wrongs do not seem like genuine wrongs, at least when the background distribution of resources is unjust. A very poor person, for example, may be held legally liable for breaching a one-sided contract with a very rich person. When such a contract reflects and reproduces existing injustice, it is hard to view the poor person’s breach of such a contract as a genuine wrong against the rich person. Conversely, some obvious moral wrongs do not generate legal liability. There is, for example, no private law duty of rescue in the absence of a prior relationship in many situations in which most would agree that there is a moral duty of rescue. Thus, private legal liability seems not to track moral wrongdoing in significant respects, raising the question what instead justifies such liability. Instead of justifying private liability in terms of the defendant’s wrongdoing, as corrective justice and civil recourse theorists do, we should seek a justification in terms of the plaintiff’s moral permission to enforce her apparent rights. Switching our gaze from the defendant’s wrongdoing to the plaintiff’s moral permission to enforce her rights will not be normatively consequential if the plaintiff’s moral permission arises when and only when the defendant has wronged her. But, I argue, background injustice can drive a wedge between genuine wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s moral permission. Thus, by reconceptualizing private liability in terms of a plaintiff’s moral permission to enforce her apparent rights, private law may be justified by the essential role it plays in constituting non-ideal political morality.

Heritage preservation easements, urban property, and heritage law: Exploring Canadian common law and civil law tools for responding to international cultural preservation frameworks for cities

This article will first situate cultural heritage preservation in the urban context through an overview of notions of outstanding universal value, the role of cities in cultural heritage and municipal archaeology generally, paths toward the equitable and sustainable development of cities, and inclusive urban cultural rights in the context of cultural heritage where these appear within international law and guiding international legal frameworks for the protection of cultural heritage. The article will also discuss the notion of the ‘public good’ as it is applied within heritage preservation decisions and will also address the balancing of public and private interests in built heritage preservation. This article will further turn to the broad legal framework of cultural heritage protection for built spaces in Canada before narrowing in on the common law concept of a heritage easement agreement – notably, how it is and can be deployed in Canada – and the civil law conservation servitude as it is available in the Civil Code of Quebec.

Automating accountability? Privacy policies, data transparency, and the third party problem

We have a data transparency problem. Currently, one of the main mechanisms we have to understand data flows is through the self-reporting that organizations provide through privacy policies. These suffer from many well-known problems, problems that are becoming more acute with the increasing complexity of the data ecosystem and the role of third parties – the affiliates, partners, processors, ad agencies, analytic services, and data brokers involved in the contemporary data practices of organizations. In this article, we argue that automating privacy policy analysis can improve the usability of privacy policies as a transparency mechanism. Our argument has five parts. First, we claim that we need to shift from thinking about privacy policies as a transparency mechanism that enhances consumer choice and see them as a transparency mechanism that enhances meaningful accountability. Second, we discuss a research tool that we prototyped, called AppTrans (for Application Transparency), which can detect inconsistencies between the declarations in a privacy policy and the actions the mobile application can potentially take if it is used. We used AppTrans to test seven hundred applications and found that 59.5 per cent were collecting data in ways that were not declared in their policies. The vast majority of the discrepancies were due to third party data collection such as adversiting and analytics. Third, we outline the follow-on research we did to extend AppTrans to analyse the information sharing of mobile applications with third parties, with mixed results. Fourth, we situate our findings in relation to the third party issues that came to light in the recent Cambridge Analytica scandal and the calls from regulators for enhanced technical safeguards in managing these third party relationships. Fifth, we discuss some of the limitations of privacy policy automation as a strategy for enhanced data transparency and the policy implications of these limitations.

The judicial review of legality

In comparative constitutional law, the various models of judicial review require courts to examine either the substantive content of legislation or the procedure through which legislation was passed. This article offers a new model of judicial review – ‘the judicial review of legality’ – in which courts review instead the forms of law. The forms of law are the ways in which law communicates its norms to the persons who are meant to comply with them, and they include generality, clarity, avoidance of contradiction, and non-retroactivity. Drawing on recent writing on the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller, this article argues that Fuller’s linking of the forms of law to a relationship of reciprocity between government and governed can ground judicial review and that such review provides a missing language to address important legislative pathologies. Moreover, through an analysis of recent developments in Israel, the article demonstrates that the judicial review of legality targets some of the key legal techniques of contemporary processes of democratic erosion which other models of judicial review struggle to address, all the while re-centring judicial review on the lawyer’s craftsmanship and thus reducing problems of court legitimacy. This article therefore offers a distinctive and normatively appealing way for courts to act in troubling times.

The death of law? Computationally personalized norms and the rule of law

The emergent power of big data analytics makes it possible to replace impersonal general legal rules with personalized, particular norms. We consider arguments that such a move would be generally beneficial, replacing crude, general laws with more efficiently targeted ways of meeting public policy goals and satisfying personal preferences. Those proposals pose a radical, new challenge to the rule of law. Data-driven legal personalization offers some benefits that are worth pursuing, but we argue that the benefits can only legitimately be pursued where doing so is consistent with the agency that the law ought to accord to individuals and with the agency that the law ought to accord to public bodies. The principle of public agency is a prerequisite for the rule of law. The principle of private agency depends on the rule of law. Each is incompatible with the unrestrained computational personalization of law.

On the breach: Identifying infringements of section 35 rights

Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has said, protects existing Aboriginal and treaty rights from unjustified infringement at the hands of federal and provincial legislatures and governments. To give meaningful effect to section 35’s protection, we need, therefore, to understand what counts as infringement of such rights and why. The Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence to date on this question, alas, disappoints; it does not withstand close critical scrutiny. This article calls attention to several shortcomings and inconsistencies in that jurisprudence and proposes for initial consideration a more inclusive approach to infringement identification, one that draws a sharper distinction between the infringement and justification inquiries. Adoption of such an approach, however, could have unwelcome substitution effects, prompting cautious courts to be more selective when asked to authenticate future claims of Aboriginal right, more penurious when construing the constitutionally protected scope of particular treaty or Aboriginal rights and/or more generous to governments during the justification inquiry. If the goal is to optimize the protection that Canadian constitutional law affords to treaty and Aboriginal rights, we shall need to be mindful of the interdependence among the authentication, infringement, and justification inquiries, and we shall need to understand much more clearly than we currently do just where the outer limits are beyond which mainstream Canadian law cannot, or will not, countenance Indigenous ways and why.

Giving reasons as a means to enhance compliance with legal norms

The threat of sanctions is often insufficient to ensure compliance with legal norms. Recently, much attention has been given to nudges – choice-preserving measures that take advantage of people’s automatic System 1 thinking – as a means of influencing behaviour without sanctions, but nudges are often ineffective and controversial. This article explores the provision of information about the reasons underlying legal norms, as a means to enhance compliance, primarily through deliberative System 2 thinking. While the idea that legal norms should be accompanied by explanatory preambles – to complement the law’s threat of sanctions with persuasion – goes back to Plato, this technique is not commonly used nowadays, and scholars have failed to systematically consider this possibility. The article argues that reason giving can enhance compliance and reduce the need for costly enforcement mechanisms. The theoretical part of the article comprises three parts. It first describes the mechanisms through which reasons may influence people’s behaviour. It then distinguishes between reason giving as a means to enhance compliance and as a means to attain other goals and between reason giving and related means to enhance compliance. Finally, it discusses various policy and pragmatic considerations that bear on the use of reason giving. Following the theoretical discussion, the empirical part of the article uses vignette studies to demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of the reason-giving technique. The results of these new studies show that providing good reasons for legal norms enhances people’s inclination to comply with them, in comparison to not providing the reasons underlying the norms. However, whereas persuasive reasons may promote compliance, questionable reasons might reduce it. We call on scholars and policy makers to pay more attention to this readily available measure of enhancing compliance with norms.