scholarly journals Epistemic levels, the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Skepticism

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tito Flores
Keyword(s):  
Easy Knowledge

O problema do conhecimento fácil tem sido definido na literatura epistemológica contemporânea com um problema que nasce de duas formas distintas. O propósito deste ensaio é mostrar que essas supostas maneiras diferentes de gerar o mesmo problema em verdade originam dois problemas distintos, que requerem respostas distintas. Um deles está relacionado à aquisição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de primeira-ordem e o outro à aquisição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de segunda-ordem. Além disso, é apresentada a maneira como o infinitismo, a teoria epistêmica segundo a qual as razões que justificam uma opinião devem ser infinitas em número e não-repetidas, pode lidar com cada um desses problemas.

WHAT THE INTERNALIST SHOULD SAY TO THE TORTOISE

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Inferential Justification ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Upper Limit ◽  
Short Piece ◽  
Vicious Regress

Carroll's (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the unfortunate position of Achilles who followed the Tortoise down a road that leads to vicious infinite regress. Or consider the conditions required for inferential justification. For idealized inferential justification, I have defended (1995, 2004, 2006) the view that to be justified in believing P on the basis of E one needs to be not only justified in believing E, but justified in believing that E makes probable P (where entailment is the upper limit of making probable). And again, critics have argued that such a strong requirement fails to learn the lesson that Achilles should have been taught by the Tortoise. Even more generally, one might well argue that strong access internalists will need to deal with a variation of Carroll's puzzle even for their accounts of non-inferential justification. In this paper I'll examine these controversies with a mind to reaching a conclusion about just exactly how one can accept intellectually demanding conditions on justified belief without encountering vicious regress.

Analysis of Knowledge Fusion System Model Based on Ontology and Multi-Agent Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 989-994 ◽  
pp. 1505-1508
Author(s):  
Li Lei ◽  
Man Zhang
Keyword(s):  
System Model ◽  
Fusion System ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
Knowledge Fusion ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Effective Use ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge

Information increase rapidly in recent years which make the effective use of information is not that easy. Knowledge fusion can improve the semantic accuracy and specification of knowledge; it’s a useful way to make the mass disordered information integrated and easy to be recognized for users. The paper proposed a knowledge fusion system model based on ontology and multi-agent theory to meet with the user’ changing needs at any time.

Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Melchior
Keyword(s):  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Closure

SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF EASY KNOWLEDGE

2008 ◽  
Vol 58 (233) ◽  
pp. 597-617 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Black
Keyword(s):  
Easy Knowledge

scholarly journals The Problem of the Criterion, Knowing that One Knows and Infinitism

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tito Alencar Flores
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Special Consideration ◽  
Fundamental Aspect ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

O problema do critério é um dos mais importantes da epistemologia. A resposta que se dá a ele definirá um aspecto fundamental das teorias do conhecimento. Neste ensaio, o problema do critério é apresentado e algumas das conseqüências geradas pela aceitação de exigências metaepistemicas são analisadas. Em especial, essas conseqüências são avaliadas em relação ao infinitismo – a teoria epistemológica segundo a qual as razões que sustentam nossas crenças devem ser infinitas em número e não-repetidas. Ao final, sustenta-se que cláusulas que exigem que a metajustificação seja necessária para o conhecimento não apenas tornam as teorias epistemológicas mais plausíveis, mas também que a ausência de tais exigências acaba criando problemas muito difíceis, como o assim chamado “problema do conhecimento fácil”. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Infinitismo. Problema do critério. Metajustificação. Conhecimento. Metaconhecimento. Ceticismo. ABSTRACT This essay discusses the Problem of the Criterion, one of the most important problems in Epistemology. The answer given to this problem will shape a fundamental aspect of theories of knowledge. It also analyzes some of the consequences epistemological theories may face in accepting metaepistemological requirements. These consequences are given special consideration with regard to Infinitism, the epistemological theory according to which the reasons that support our beliefs must be infinite and non-repeating. Finally, this essay claims not only that those propositions that require metajustification make any theory, even Infinitism, more plausible, but also that the absence of such requirements creates difficult problems, such as the so-called “Problem of Easy Knowledge.” KEY WORDS – Infinitism. Problem of the Criterion. Metajustification. Knowledge. Metaknowledge. Skepticism.

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