Kant's Moral Argument for the existence of God

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeng-Hoon Huh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Argument ◽  
Existence Of God

The Moral Argument For The Non-Existence Of God

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-352
Author(s):  
Thomas Krettek ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Argument ◽  
Existence Of God

The Phenomenological Moral Argument

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-151
Author(s):  
Jonathan Ashbach ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Theology ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
New Variant

The moral argument for the existence of God is a popular and rhetorically effective element of natural theology, but both its traditional ontological and epistemological forms rely upon controversial premises. This article proposes a new variant—the phenomenological moral argument, or PMA—that is exclusively empirical in form. The PMA notes several empirical aspects of moral experience (seven are discussed in the version presented here) that cohere much more naturally with a theistic than with an atheistic account of conscience’s origins. It therefore concludes that divine creation best explains the nature of moral experience, and thus, that God exists.

Evaluative claims within the problem of evil

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-377
Author(s):  
TOBY BETENSON
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

AbstractThe problem of evil contains some evaluative claims. Recognizing the fundamental role of the evaluative claims within the problem of evil presents two significant problems for the argument from evil. First, in order for the argument from evil to be successful, the normative assumptions that underlie the evaluative claims within the problem of evil must be deployed consistently both within the problem and between those who are discussing the problem. This level of normative agreement is likely to be difficult to achieve. Second, the argument from evil moves from evaluative premises to a non-evaluative conclusion, and thus commits the same error that J. L. Mackie identifies the moral argument for the existence of God as committing: it gets the direction of supervenience between facts and values back-to-front. Mackie's criticisms of the moral argumentforthe existence of God ought to also apply to the moral argumentagainstthe existence of God. If my analysis is correct, and Mackie's point is valid, then the argument from evil will be left fatally undermined. The problem of evil cannot be used to argue for the conclusion that ‘God does not exist’.

Reinterpreting the Proofs of The Existence of God

1980 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. J. M. Bench-Capon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Moral Arguments

In this century the major insight in the field of moral philosophy has been that moral arguments need not proceed by way of the deduction of moral conclusions from non-moral premises. This realisation sprang from a recognition that the purpose of moral argument was not just to get one party to a moral disagreement to assent to a proposition that at the outset of the discussion he denied. If a moral argument was to be able to be considered successful it was insufficient for someone to recognise that an action he had previously considered right was wrong; it was essential that this recognition have an influence on his subsequent conduct. The change in belief was important only in so far as it led to a change in action. And although this insight led people to over diminish the importance of belief and propose various types of non-cognitive theories of ethics, it is none the less true that the acceptance of a proposition of the form ‘action X is wrong’ must have an impact of some kind on the behaviour of those who accept it.

scholarly journals Ordinary Morality Implies Atheism

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Maitzen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Ordinary Morality

I present a “moral argument” for the non-existence of God. Theism, I argue, can’t accommodate an ordinary and fundamental moral obligation acknowledged by many people, including many theists. My argument turns on a principle that a number of philosophers already accept as a constraint on God’s treatment of human beings. I defend the principle against objections from those inclined to reject it. 

The Interconnection of Faith and Morals

Philosophy ◽  
1943 ◽  
Vol 18 (71) ◽  
pp. 253-264
Author(s):  
R. G. Norburn
Keyword(s):  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Moral Consciousness ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Late Professor ◽  
Actual Fact ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World

“The well-intentioned person…must…assume the being of a moral author of the world, that is, a God” (Critique of Judgement, B. 391). Since Kant wrote those words, the so-called Moral Argument has been a battleground. In our day, at least three eminent Gifford lecturers have attested the view that the facts of the moral life are such as to warrant the belief that when truly analysed and their implications brought to light, certain quite definite theistic conclusions emerge. I refer, of course, to Professors Taylor and De Burgh and to the late Professor Sorley. But, whilst a more recent holder of that illustrious office, Professor Laird, has expressed his scepticism, no less an authority than Professor N. Hartmann on the other hand holds the opinion that far from morality implying any sort of theistic conclusion, in actual fact a living authentic morality suggests quite the opposite and seemingly postulates the non-existence of God. This somewhat startling divergence of view is accentuated by their common agreement on one all-important point, namely, that the moral consciousness recognizes an unconditional obligation to realize certain moral values which are absolute and ultimate.

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