Buddhist Ethics as Moral Phenomenology

This chapter explains Buddhist ethics as moral phenomenology, that is, as a theory of the transformation of our moral experience of ourselves, others, and the world. It compares Buddhist “input ethics” to Western “output ethics” and explains how Buddhist practice aims at developing a less pathological, less egocentric view of our place in the world by cultivating a sense of interdependence. The discussion is grounded in Śāntideva’s Bodhicāryāvatāra, and explores his insights on anger, aversion, vice, and generosity. Śāntideva argues for the importance of developing our moral self-awareness, and changing the way we view suffering, both of ourselves and others.

The change in the concept of virtue during the COVID-19 pandemic

The purpose of the article is to cover the change in the concept of virtue during the COVID-19 pandemic, show its connection with human values and ethics. Virtue is the highest spiritual quality of a person. The main virtues include wisdom, courage, justice, moderation, responsiveness, loyalty, modesty, generosity and many others that affect all aspects of human life. Despite the recognized value of virtue as a system of moral guidelines, its concept is fraught with disputes about whether it is really generally valid, as well as about the problem of the effectiveness of virtue as a universal guideline and criterion for moral choice and its relevance in modern moral experience. This article argues that the most significant shift in the concept of virtue during the pandemic was the rethinking and increased awareness of the importance of such virtues as solidarity and moral responsibility, as well as aspects of relationships with people such as kindness, compassion, and empathy. It is proved that the concept of virtue has moved from a question of choice to the category of necessity, the most important guideline and guarantee of the common good.

An Aetiology of Recognition

This chapter explores the suggestion that early attachment underpins the human capacity for empathy, and that empathy, in turn, is a condition of moral competence. We are disposed by nature to seek intimacy with our human conspecifics: the securely attached child learns that, whatever perils the world may hold, his well-being is shielded within the private sphere of personal intimacy. But why should secure attachment also favour—as it does—recognition of moral obligations towards those with whom we have no special standing and share no personal destiny—recognition that the claims of persons as such merit our attention and regard? One answer to this question looks beyond the fact of secure attachment to a further psychological capacity, our capacity for empathy: secure attachment promotes susceptibility to empathy, and an appropriate susceptibility to empathy is a condition of basic moral competence. The chapter proposes that the deeper and more persisting significance of empathy to morality can be understood from a developmental perspective. Looking to mentalization-based attachment theory allows us to understand how empathic mirroring enters into our earliest intimate, interactions with other persons, securing our default commitment to recognizing their reality as bound up with our own. In this way, empathy constitutes one of the natural foundations on which the more complex architecture of moral experience is constructed. Attachment theory helps us to understand the indispensable role empathy plays at the beginning of the circuitous road to virtue.

Heteronomi som forutsetning for autonomi

In his major works in ethics, Immanuel Kant (1724—1804) does not pay much attention to the question how humans become moral. The main tasks for Kant in these works are to establish the moral law and discuss its application. However, in his minor works in ethics and pedagogy he draws our attention to the question mentioned and claims that humans first become moral when they get 16 years old. Before we reach this age, our will (Willkür) is able to choose, that means prioritize, between rationality (the moral law) and sensitivity (inclinations), but our will (Wille) lacks the capacity to impose the moral law on ourselves. To evolve in this regard so that our will becomes fully moral and autonomous, we need moral restrictions from other people with more moral experience. The relevant Kantian distinction in this regard is the distinction Kant draws between persons and moral actors in the wake of his formula of the categorical imperative called the formula of humanity. According to this distinction, a person needs to be educated heteronomously in order to reach the level of moral actor and become autonomous. Constraint is therefore a necessary condition for self-constraint.

Introduction

A vignette about environmentalist Colin Beavan’s experience of and reflection on environmental guilt and shame introduces the texture of these moral emotions experienced by many everyday environmentalists and sets the stage for the ensuing analysis. Taking this moral experience seriously reveals underexplored motivations and hindrances to environmental action, guilt, and shame. Reflection on these moral emotions challenges many modern ethical assumptions and forms the basis of the three main ethical arguments of the book: that collectives as well as individuals have guilt, shame, and responsibility; that some individuals and collectives should feel guilt and shame for environmental degradation including climate change; and that, given the consequences of guilt and shame, they should not be intentionally induced unless a number of conditions, which can be fostered through rituals, are met. These conditions are also necessary to respond to unintentionally elicited guilt and shame. To set the stage for these theoretical and practical arguments, the Introduction names the ethical values which influence the text and the disciplinary resources from social psychology; ethical pragmatism; virtue ethics; and religious studies, especially ritual theory, used in the project. It also delineates the scope of the book as the Western developed world, particularly the United States, and environmental guilt and shame, of which climate change is the main example.

Figuring Things Out, Morally Speaking

The appeal of the moral principle according to which we should treat like cases alike is so great that it verges on the axiomatic, or on the platitudinous. Recently, however, the principle has been challenged in deeply interesting ways. These ways are interesting because they do not invite skepticism about morality at large, but about the specific claim that what is good (or bad) for an agent in a given situation must be good (or bad) for any other similarly situated agent. I here assess the post-challenge viability of the principle. In a sense, the principle survives, but this is neither an unqualified victory nor an inspiring result. The examination of these matters contains an important (and under-investigated) lesson about the nature of moral experience.