Purpose
This study aims to examine the effects of investor protection (PROT), internal and external corporate governance (CG) on private information-based trading (PIBT).
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses a sample of 3,438 firms from 42 countries for the period 2002–2015 to examine the effects of the broad and specific measures of PROT, internal CG and external CG (product market competition and block ownership [BOWN]) on a more accurate measure of PIBT using regression analysis.
Findings
The results show that PROT and BOWN are effective in reducing PIBT. However, the specific measure of PROT (strength of PROT) is not significant in emerging markets and civil law countries. The internal CG is also significant but has a positive effect on PIBT.
Research limitations/implications
The results suggest that PROT law matters in the efforts to prevent PIBT. Policymakers and securities market regulators, particularly in emerging markets and civil law countries, should focus more on refining existing securities laws and enacting detailed securities rules that explicitly prevent specific market manipulation and PIBT.
Originality/value
This study provides evidence for the importance of specific and detailed securities rules in different market and legal environments. Furthermore, this study uses the segregated private information-based speculative trading component to accurately measure the PIBT.
Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in Emerging Markets
