scholarly journals King and Spencer (eds.), Edward I: New Interpretations (York Medieval Press, 2020)

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Benjamin Linley Wild
Keyword(s):  
2007 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy B. Stevenson

Although little detailed consideration has been given to the Treaty of Northampton of 1290 by Scottish historians, it seems to have been implicitly accepted as the sort of treaty which might have been expected in connection with the marriage of two independent rulers at that time. This is in spite of the fact that throughout the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the traditional practice of the rulers of the Angevin and Plantagenet dominions was to rule each constituent part according to its own law and customs. This article examines the reasons why the Scots were not prepared to rely on tradition but insisted on a written promise from Edward I that Scotland would remain independent of England. It also suggests that the treaty is more than a written expression of traditional practice. It has a number of specific clauses which, it is argued, give the treaty the character of a charter of liberties. These were intended to prevent the imposition on the Scots of particular aspects of Plantagenet rule in England which burdened its subjects much more severely than the rule of Scottish kings had burdened the Scots. The Scots' wish to remain independent after the proposed union of the crowns and their struggle to maintain that independence after the death of the Maid are generally seen as manifestations of a sense of community or regnal solidarity. The terms of the Treaty of 1290 suggest that it was not just from a desire to be a separate political entity per se that the Scots fought during the so-called Wars of Independence but also because the Scots were anxious to avoid the more oppressive aspects of Plantagenet rule even before they had experience of this after Edward I's conquest of 1296.


1973 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 316
Author(s):  
Baruch Lev
Keyword(s):  

1867 ◽  
Vol s3-XI (263) ◽  
pp. 29-29
Author(s):  
W. H. Hart
Keyword(s):  

1867 ◽  
Vol s3-XI (265) ◽  
pp. 83-84
Author(s):  
George Vere Irving
Keyword(s):  

1986 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-8
Author(s):  
Marilyn K. Nellis
Keyword(s):  

1979 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles T. Wood

Among the familiar sights crowding the landscape of English history from the dooms of Ine to that crown plucked from a hawthorn bush at Bosworth, none is more deeply cherished than the crisis of 1297 and the “Confirmation of the Charters” to which it gave rise. For, despite all the sharp differences over detail that the documentation for this crisis has engendered, scholars have shown remarkable agreement in seeing it as the one defeat suffered by Edward I in a long and notably successful reign. And to that defeat they have attributed great constitutional significance. Stubbs set the pattern, calling the “result singularly in harmony with what seems from history and experience to be the natural direction of English progress,” and Wilkinson is only one among the many who have recently elaborated on that theme:The crisis of 1297 … placed a definite check on the tendencies which Edward I had shown, to ignore the deep principles of the constitution under stress of the necessities which confronted the nation … It was a landmark in the advance of the knights … toward political maturity. It helped to establish the tradition of co-operation and political alliance between the knights and the magnates, on which a good deal of the political future of England was to depend …. What the opposition achieved, in 1297, was a great vindication of the ancient political principle of government by consent ….


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