scholarly journals On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of an Investment Timing Game

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard R Ruble ◽  
Bruno P. A. Versaevel
2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (02) ◽  
pp. 271-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
RYUTA TAKASHIMA ◽  
MAKOTO GOTO ◽  
MOTOH TSUJIMURA

We consider an optimal investment problem when a firm such as an electric power company has the operational flexibility to expand and contract capacity with fixed cost. This problem is formulated as an impulse control problem combined with optimal stopping. Consequently, we obtain optimal investment timing, optimal capacity expansion and contraction timing, and the investment value. We also show investment, capacity expansion and contraction rule are influenced by the price volatility and the initial capacity is also influenced by the ratio between base-load plant and peak-load plant. In addition, we investigate how time lag between investment and operation influences the investment rule.


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