Long-Lived Consumers, Intertemporal Bundling, and Tacit Collusion

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Dana ◽  
Yuk-fai Fong
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Collusion

Tacit Collusion in Real-Time U.S. Electricity Auctions

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Benjamin
Keyword(s):  
Real Time ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Electricity Auctions

scholarly journals Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillem Roig
Keyword(s):  
Switching Costs ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Hand Preference ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Opposing Effects ◽  
Lock In

Abstract When consumers have preference costs, two opposing effects need to be assessed to analyse the incentives of firms to set collusive prices. On the one hand, preference costs make a deviation from collusion less attractive, as the deviating firm must offer a large enough discount to cover the preference costs. On the other hand, preference costs lock in consumers and make punishment from rivals less effective. When preference costs are low, the latter of the two effects dominates and collusion is more challenging to sustain than in a situation with no preference costs. With high enough preference costs, collusion is a (weakly) dominant strategy. These results do not eventuate in a model with switching costs.

scholarly journals Scanner Data: New Opportunities for Demand and Competitive Strategy Analysis

1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald W. Cotterill
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Scanner Data ◽  
Strategy Analysis ◽  
Price Response ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Sufficient Detail ◽  
Bertrand Price Competition ◽  
Reaction Equations

This paper reviews prior research by agricultural economists on the demand for food products using scanner data. Thereafter, a differentiated product's oligopoly model with Bertrand price competition is developed and used to specify brand level demand and oligopoly price reaction equations. The model has sufficient detail to estimate brand level price elasticities and price response elasticities which in turn can be used to estimate three indices of market power. The first index estimated is the familiar Rothschild Index. The paper develops estimates two new indexes, the observed index and the Chamberlin quotient for tacit collusion. It concludes with comments on how the proposed method for the measurement of market power in a differentiated oligopoly can be improved.

Learning Agents in an Artificial Power Exchange: Tacit Collusion, Market Power and Efficiency of Two Double-auction Mechanisms

2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 73-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Guerci ◽  
Stefano Ivaldi ◽  
Silvano Cincotti
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Learning Agents ◽  
Power Exchange ◽  
Auction Mechanisms

Tacit Collusion and Voluntary Disclosure: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Automotive Industry

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Bertomeu ◽  
John Harry Evans ◽  
Mei Feng ◽  
Ayung Tseng
Keyword(s):  
Automotive Industry ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
The U.S

Cartels and Tacit Collusion

2002 ◽  
pp. 206-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Dick
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Collusion

scholarly journals Tacit Collusion: The Neglected Experimental Evidence

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Engel
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Tacit Collusion

scholarly journals On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of an Investment Timing Game

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard R Ruble ◽  
Bruno P. A. Versaevel
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Investment Timing ◽  
Timing Game
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