Ownership and Asymmetric Information Problems in the Corporate Loan Market: Evidence from a Heteroskedastic Regression

Author(s):  
Viktors Stebunovs ◽  
Lewis W Gaul
2004 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina V Atanasova ◽  
Nicholas Wilson
Keyword(s):  
The Uk ◽  

2007 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
pp. 2969-3007 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK CAREY ◽  
GREG NINI
Keyword(s):  

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (5) ◽  
pp. 1311-1328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine A Parlour ◽  
Uday Rajan

We present a model of an unsecured loan market. Many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts (a debt level and an interest rate) to a borrower. The borrower may accept more than one contract. Her payoff if she defaults increases in the total amount borrowed. If this payoff is high enough, deterministic zero-profit equilibria cannot be sustained. Lenders earn a positive profit, and may even charge the monopoly price. The positive-profit equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders. Despite the absence of asymmetric information, the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit. (JEL D43, L13, L14)


2019 ◽  
Vol 157 ◽  
pp. 275-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sajid M. Chaudhry ◽  
Elnaz Bajoori ◽  
Shasi Nandeibam

2007 ◽  
pp. 93-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Agarwal ◽  
Brent W. Ambrose ◽  
Souphala Chomsisengphet

2004 ◽  
Vol 2004 (813) ◽  
pp. 1-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Carey ◽  
◽  
Greg Nini
Keyword(s):  

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