Competition in Loan Contracts

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (5) ◽  
pp. 1311-1328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine A Parlour ◽  
Uday Rajan
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Debt Level ◽  
Loan Market ◽  
Competitive Outcome ◽  
Monopoly Price

We present a model of an unsecured loan market. Many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts (a debt level and an interest rate) to a borrower. The borrower may accept more than one contract. Her payoff if she defaults increases in the total amount borrowed. If this payoff is high enough, deterministic zero-profit equilibria cannot be sustained. Lenders earn a positive profit, and may even charge the monopoly price. The positive-profit equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders. Despite the absence of asymmetric information, the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit. (JEL D43, L13, L14)

Developing-country resource extraction with asymmetric information and sovereign debt: a theoretical analysis

1997 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-289
Author(s):  
JON STRAND
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Developing Country ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Resource Extraction ◽  
Probability Of Default ◽  
Rapid Extraction ◽  
The Interest Rate ◽  
Period Model

We consider a two-period model of an indebted developing country endowed with a natural resource whose extraction causes negative global externalities, where the country may borrow in period one and there is asymmetric information about its willingness to service its loans. We show that when the resource is large, the interest rate on new borrowing equals the resource growth rate. A greater initial debt level then leads to reduced new borrowing and more rapid extraction. An outside 'donor' may affect the resource extraction of the country. Donor schemes that tie debt reduction to postponing or abstaining from extraction of the resource are more powerful than non-conditional schemes in reducing the extraction rate for governments that actually repay, but may in some cases lead to a greater probability of default through increased debt. While conditional schemes generally are potentially Pareto-superior to non-conditional ones, the welfare of the borrowing country is higher with non-conditional schemes.

scholarly journals Banking Disintermediation and Its Implication for Monetary Policy: The Case of Indonesia

2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Halim Alamsyah ◽  
Doddy Zulverdi ◽  
Iman Gunadi ◽  
Rendra Z. Idris ◽  
Bambang Pramono
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Rating Agencies

Paper ini berupaya menganalisa implikasi perilaku bank dalam menentukan portofolio terhadap tingkat efektivitas kebijakan moneter. Dengan kerangka analisa comparative static, paper ini mengetengahkan model industri perbankan yang bersifat monopolis dimana pemilik bank memaksimalkan profit dengan kendala tertentu baik yang berasal dari kesanggupan modal maupun kendala akibat regulasi.Kalibrasi model pada kondisi optimal, mengindikasikan bahwa penurunan fungsi disintermediasi bank yang didominasi oleh faktor asymmetric information, akan berakibat pada menurunnya efektifitas kebijakan moneter.Kesimpulan ini berimplikasi pada (i) perlunya Biro Kredit dan rating agencies untuk menyempurnakan informasi, (ii) perlunya investasi yang lebih besar oleh perbankan atas kapasitas riset dan sistem monitoring, (iii) perlunya mempertimbangkan skema garansi kredit, (iv) perlunya koordinasi yang lebih baik antara kebijakan mikro dan makro demi kestabilan makro yang akan meningkatkan keyakinan publik dan terakhir, (v) perlunya mempromosikan perkembangan lembaga keuangan non-bank, untuk mengurangi ketergantungan pembiayaan atas lembaga perbankan.JEL: E52, E58, G21Keyword: Disintermediation, monetary policy, banking sector, interest rate.

Asymmetric Information and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 428-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrike Neyer
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Transmission Mechanism ◽  
Monetary Transmission ◽  
Credit Channel ◽  
Absolute Value ◽  
Monetary Transmission Mechanism ◽  
External Finance

Abstract This paper analyses the consequences of asymmetric information in credit markets for the monetary transmission mechanism. It shows that asymmetric information can not only reinforce but can also weaken or overcompensate the effects of the standard interest rate channel. Crucial is that informational problems lead to an external finance premium that can be positive or negative for marginal entrepreneurs. Tight money may lead to an increase in the absolute value of this premium, implying that there is a credit channel of monetary policy, but its working direction is ambiguous.

Prices Return

2019 ◽  
pp. 195-217
Author(s):  
Philip T. Hoffman ◽  
Gilles Postel-Vinay ◽  
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Credit Rationing ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Price Equilibrium ◽  
Economics Literature ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
Pooling Equilibria ◽  
Shed Light

This chapter considers the transition to a new equilibrium in 1899 by reviewing some economics literature that deals with three different issues that arise in the transition from a single-price equilibrium to a range of prices. The first suggests that when there is substantial asymmetric information, price competition in credit markets may be reduced, if not eliminated, in favor of credit rationing. Next, the chapter studies why the equilibrium in a credit rationing market may feature a single interest rate. Finally, it examines a third approach that analyzes conditions under which such pooling equilibria may unravel. This economics literature helps shed light on the transition from the near universal five-percent interest rate equilibrium to a regime with a distribution of rates in the late nineteenth century.

scholarly journals Asymmetric Information and the Automobile Loan Market

2007 ◽  
pp. 93-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Agarwal ◽  
Brent W. Ambrose ◽  
Souphala Chomsisengphet
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Loan Market
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