On the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Markets

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall S. Kroszner
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
The Political ◽  
Financial Regulatory

The political economy of Australian regulatory reform

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darcy W. E. Allen ◽  
Chris Berg ◽  
Aaron M. Lane ◽  
Patrick A. McLaughlin
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
The Political

scholarly journals Banking on Democracy: The Political Economy of International Private Bank Lending in Emerging Markets

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Rodríguez ◽  
Javier Santiso
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Bank Lending ◽  
The Political ◽  
Private Bank

The Political Economy of Residual State Ownership in Privatized Firms: Evidence from Emerging Markets

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narjess Boubakri ◽  
Jean-Claude Cosset ◽  
Omrane Guedhami ◽  
Walid Saffar
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
The Political ◽  
Privatized Firms

The Political Economy of Trade Reform in Emerging Markets

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Draper ◽  
Philip Alves ◽  
Razeen Sally
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
The Political ◽  
Trade Reform

The Political Economy of Emerging Markets

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Santiso
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
The Political

The Political Economy of Trade Reform in Emerging Markets: Crisis or Opportunity?

2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-285
Author(s):  
C. Henning
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
The Political ◽  
Trade Reform

State of the Art and Research Design

2020 ◽  
pp. 18-34
Author(s):  
Scott James ◽  
Lucia Quaglia
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Research Design ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Study Selection ◽  
Regulatory Strategy ◽  
International Comparative ◽  
Financial Regulatory

This chapter reviews the main bodies of literature in international/comparative political economy and public policy, elucidating why existing work has insufficient explanatory power. Second, it then outlines the theoretical framework of the book, its research design, methodology and operationalization, and case-study selection. The analysis employs a two-step approach. The first explains the UK’s financial regulatory preferences (supporting or resisting more stringent rules, i.e. ‘trading up’) as the outcome of the interaction of key domestic actors: elected officials, financial regulators, and the financial industry. In the second step, we explain the UK’s regulatory strategy in international/EU negotiations (as ‘pace setting’, ‘foot dragging’, or ‘fence sitting’) and its influence over regulatory outcomes. By analysing financial regulatory reform as a ‘three-level game’, the domestic political economy approach captures the interdependency of different negotiating arenas over time. The book draws on over sixty in-depth interviews conducted between 2012 and 2019.

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