scholarly journals Mixed Strategies in Discriminatory Divisible-Good Auctions

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Anderson ◽  
Par Holmberg ◽  
Andrew Philpott
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions

scholarly journals Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward J. Anderson ◽  
Pär Holmberg ◽  
Andrew B. Philpott
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions

scholarly journals Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Konstantin Kudryavtsev ◽  
Ustav Malkov
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Hippocratic Oath ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Berge Equilibrium ◽  
Do No Harm ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

Flexibility and Firmness in Crisis Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199417
Author(s):  
Vesna Danilovic ◽  
Joe Clare
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Theoretical Rationale ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Tit For Tat

Our study compares the efficacy of mixed bargaining strategies to strict coercion or accommodation. While mixed strategies can be approached from different conceptual angles, we focus on flexible and/or firm postures as signaling properties of bargaining. In our theory and empirical analysis, we show that the combination of firmness with flexibility on both sides, without necessarily scripted rules as in tit-for-tat, leads to peaceful resolution without unilateral concessions. Its opposite, resolute firmness is unlikely to make the opponent yield, as assumed in influential literature of the traditional canon. If anything, war is most likely when both sides opt for it. We provide the theoretical rationale for these expectations, which are validated in our empirical analysis of the ICB crisis dataset for the 1918 to 2015 period. Our study also points to the bargaining process as a potential causal mechanism between democracy and peace, and therefore has relevant implications for several research strands.

Mixed strategies can't evade Pascal's Wager

Analysis ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 642-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Monton
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Pascal’S Wager

Evolution and Mixed Strategies

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore ◽  
Larry Samuelson
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategies

scholarly journals When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

2006 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orly Sade ◽  
Charles Schnitzlein ◽  
Jaime F. Zender
Keyword(s):  
Potential Demand ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions

Asymmetry in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental investigation

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orly Sade ◽  
Charles R. Schnitzlein ◽  
Jaime F. Zender
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions

On entry, exit, and coordination with mixed strategies

2000 ◽  
Vol 44 (8) ◽  
pp. 1557-1576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Vettas
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategies
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document