Game Theoretical Aspects of the Minds of Gods

From Pascal’s Wager and Guthrie’s theory of religion as anthropomorphism to supernatural punishment and the distribution of ritual centers, elements of game theory have been useful for framing various dilemmas that people face between each other and their deities. This chapter first provides a brief introduction to game theory and discusses how it has been used to address various questions in the context of religion and cooperation. It then concludes with a brief discussion of how future research might use it to investigate particular religious traditions.

Epilogue

The short epilogue asks whether the observations this study makes about Fakhr al-Din al-Razi early career before he reached the age of 40, when he wrote philosophical books, are also true for his late œuvre? It suggests that during his late life, al-Razi was overwhelmed by an argument similar to Pascal’s wager: If the rational evidence in favor of a philosophical God is equal in strength to the rational evidence for the God of kalam, prudence dictates to choses the latter. This, because if kalam is right and God is a free-choosing and omniscient agent, then He will punish all those who deny these attributes. The God of philosophy, however, will not punish believers in those attributes. A decision in favor of the God of kalam will, in whatever circumstance, not trigger punishment in the afterlife. In his late work al-Razi decided in favor of the God of kalam, not because he thought such a decision is more convincing, but because it is more prudent.

Infini-Rien: Ist Pascals Wettargument formallogisch ungültig?

In the Infini-Rien fragment of his Pensées, Blaise Pascal develops an argument for the rationality of faith in God, which posthumously became known as Pascal’s Wager and at the same time represents a cornerstone of modern probability theory. While this betting argument has been the subject of much philosophical investigation, the contribution of this paper lies in the following: On the one hand, the bet is reconstructed in its basic features as well as its structure with the help of modern decision and probability theory tools. Thus, it is shown that Pascal’s betting argument, in distinction to Hacking 1972 for instance, has the form of an a fortiori argument. On the other hand, as far as objections to Pascal’s argument are concerned, it is true that the premises have often been called into doubt, more or less convincingly. On the other hand, this article is dedicated to the question, often emphatically – especially in Hacking 1972 – and perhaps carelessly affirmed in Pascal research, whether Pascal’s premises imply his conclusion at all.