Early Mover Advantages: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael K. McShane ◽  
Yanling Ge ◽  
Larry A. A. Cox
Keyword(s):  
Long Term Care ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

scholarly journals Medical Underwriting In Long-Term Care Insurance: Market Conditions Limit Options For Higher-Risk Consumers

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (8) ◽  
pp. 1494-1503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Portia Y. Cornell ◽  
David C. Grabowski ◽  
Marc Cohen ◽  
Xiaomei Shi ◽  
David G. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
Long Term Care ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

Adverse selection in a start-up long-term care insurance market ‐ Abstract of the London Discussion

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-365
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Long Term Care ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Publication Type ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

This abstract relates to the following paper: AdamsC.Adverse selection in a start-up long-term care insurance market. British Actuarial Journal. doi:10.1017/S1357321714000270

Early Mover Advantages: Evidence From the Long-Term Care Insurance Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 1115-1141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael K. McShane ◽  
Larry A. Cox ◽  
Yanling Ge
Keyword(s):  
Long Term Care ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

scholarly journals Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 938-958 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Finkelstein ◽  
Kathleen McGarry
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Long Term Care ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Multiple Dimensions ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

We demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long-term care insurance market. Two types of people purchase insurance: individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance. Ex post, the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect, while the latter are lower risk. In aggregate, those with more insurance are not higher risk. Our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence. The results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information.

scholarly journals Long-Term Care: Is There Crowding Out of Informal Care, Private Insurance as Well as Saving?

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Zweifel ◽  
Christophe Courbage
Keyword(s):  
Informal Care ◽  
Long Term Care ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance ◽  
Crowd Out

AbstractPublicly provided long-term care (LTC) insurance with means-tested benefits is suspected to crowd out either private LTC insurance (Brown and Finkelstein 2008. The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market.

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