scholarly journals Long-Term Care: Is There Crowding Out of Informal Care, Private Insurance as Well as Saving?

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Zweifel ◽  
Christophe Courbage
Keyword(s):  
Informal Care ◽  
Long Term Care ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance ◽  
Crowd Out

AbstractPublicly provided long-term care (LTC) insurance with means-tested benefits is suspected to crowd out either private LTC insurance (Brown and Finkelstein 2008. The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market.

scholarly journals The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (3) ◽  
pp. 1083-1102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R Brown ◽  
Amy Finkelstein
Keyword(s):  
Long Term Care ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Limited Efficacy ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance ◽  
Crowd Out

We show that even incomplete public insurance can crowd out private insurance demand. We estimate that Medicaid could explain the lack of private long-term care insurance for about two-thirds of the wealth distribution, even if no other factors limited the market's size. Yet Medicaid provides incomplete consumption smoothing for most individuals. Medicaid's crowd-out effect stems from the large implicit tax (about 60–75 percent for a median-wealth individual) that Medicaid imposes on private insurance. An implication is that public policies designed to stimulate the private insurance market will have limited efficacy as long as Medicaid's large implicit tax remains. (JEL G22, I18, I38)

scholarly journals Crowding Out of Long-Term Care Insurance: Evidence from European Expectations Data

2015 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 74-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan Costa-Font ◽  
Christophe Courbage
Keyword(s):  
Long Term Care ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

scholarly journals Medical Underwriting In Long-Term Care Insurance: Market Conditions Limit Options For Higher-Risk Consumers

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (8) ◽  
pp. 1494-1503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Portia Y. Cornell ◽  
David C. Grabowski ◽  
Marc Cohen ◽  
Xiaomei Shi ◽  
David G. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
Long Term Care ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

Adverse selection in a start-up long-term care insurance market ‐ Abstract of the London Discussion

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-365
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Long Term Care ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Publication Type ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

This abstract relates to the following paper: AdamsC.Adverse selection in a start-up long-term care insurance market. British Actuarial Journal. doi:10.1017/S1357321714000270

Private Long-Term Care Insurance and State Tax Incentives

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
David G. Stevenson ◽  
Richard G. Frank ◽  
Jocelyn Tau
Keyword(s):  
Long Term Care ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Tax Incentives ◽  
National Data ◽  
Term Care ◽  
State Tax ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance

To increase the role of private insurance in financing long-term care, tax incentives for long-term care insurance have been implemented at both the federal and state levels. To date, there has been surprisingly little study of these initiatives. Using a panel of national data, we find that market take-up for long-term care insurance increased over the last decade, but state tax incentives were responsible for only a small portion of this growth. Ultimately, the modest ability of state tax incentives to lower premiums implies that they should be viewed as a small piece of the long-term care financing puzzle.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document