Quality of Bank Capital and Credit Growth in the Global Financial Crisis

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Kosak ◽  
Shaofang Li ◽  
Igor Loncarski ◽  
Matej Marinc
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-657
Author(s):  
Irena Pyka ◽  
Aleksandra Nocoń ◽  
Mateusz Muszyński

Motivation: After the global financial crisis, banks’ financial safety has been considered as a public good and put under closer control and supervision. The prudential regulations of credit institutions which are the main subject of the study, have been significantly tightened. Although the minimum level of banks’ own funds, set adequately to the risk, had been a fundamental indicator of banks’ financial safety since the end of 1980s, after the global financial crisis the quality of this capital has changed and the scope of its regulation has been increased. By respecting the new prudential standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the international level, financial safety of the banks has been additionally put under the macro-supervision. The concern about the overregulation of the banking system raises many controversies, what justifies conducting research on this subject. Aim: The main purpose of the article is to identify changes in the bank’s strategies of creating financial safety after the global financial crisis, considering macro- and micro-prudential regulations, aimed at strengthening the level and quality of bank capital, based on the results of the conducted research. Results: The results of the empirical research indicate that there is a strong belief among management staff in commercial banks in Poland that the increase in the level and structure of the own funds in credit institutions rises their financial safety. The results confirm the intensification of the process of implementing Basel regulations in commercial banks in Poland.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peiyi Yu ◽  
Jessica Hong Yang ◽  
Nada Kakabadse

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 259
Author(s):  
Young-Hee Kang ◽  
Kyunga Na

Although the global financial crisis of 2008 had tremendous effects on global businesses, its impact on firm performance in emerging markets is unknown. To develop this knowledge, this study explores the factors that influenced labor productivity in emerging markets before and after the crisis. Using a sample of 2,061 Mexican firms that were collected by the World Bank in 2006 and 2010, this study investigates the relationships of bribery, informality, and corporate governance to labor productivity. The results show that, before the crisis, informality and foreign ownership were positively associated with labor productivity. On the other hand, after the crisis, bribery and informality are negatively related to labor productivity, while foreign ownership and external auditing make positive impacts on labor productivity. The findings imply that businesses need to improve the quality of their corporate governance and decrease bribery. Governments of emerging markets need to reduce the levels of informality.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (256) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Antoshin ◽  
Marco Arena ◽  
Nikolay Gueorguiev ◽  
Tonny Lybek ◽  
John Ralyea ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Antoshin ◽  
Marco Arena ◽  
Nikolay Gueorguiev ◽  
Tonny Lybek ◽  
John Ralyea ◽  
...  

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