Quality of Bank Capital and Bank Lending Behaviour During the Global Financial Crisis

Author(s):  
Shaofang Li
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-657
Author(s):  
Irena Pyka ◽  
Aleksandra Nocoń ◽  
Mateusz Muszyński

Motivation: After the global financial crisis, banks’ financial safety has been considered as a public good and put under closer control and supervision. The prudential regulations of credit institutions which are the main subject of the study, have been significantly tightened. Although the minimum level of banks’ own funds, set adequately to the risk, had been a fundamental indicator of banks’ financial safety since the end of 1980s, after the global financial crisis the quality of this capital has changed and the scope of its regulation has been increased. By respecting the new prudential standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the international level, financial safety of the banks has been additionally put under the macro-supervision. The concern about the overregulation of the banking system raises many controversies, what justifies conducting research on this subject. Aim: The main purpose of the article is to identify changes in the bank’s strategies of creating financial safety after the global financial crisis, considering macro- and micro-prudential regulations, aimed at strengthening the level and quality of bank capital, based on the results of the conducted research. Results: The results of the empirical research indicate that there is a strong belief among management staff in commercial banks in Poland that the increase in the level and structure of the own funds in credit institutions rises their financial safety. The results confirm the intensification of the process of implementing Basel regulations in commercial banks in Poland.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Efthalia Tabouratzi ◽  
Christos Lemonakis ◽  
Alexandros Garefalakis

The globalization and the global financial crisis provide a new extremely competitive environment for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). During the latest years, the increased number of firms’ default has generated the need of understanding the factors of firms’ default, as SMEs in periods of financial crisis suffer from lack of financial resources and expensive bank lending. We use a sample of 3600 Greek manufacturing firms (9 Sectors), covering the time period of 2003-2011 (9 years). We run a panel regression model with correction for fixed effects in both the cross-section and period dimensions using as dependent variable the calculated Z-Score of each firm, and as independent variables several financial ratios, as well as the exporting activity and the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS Accounting Standards).We find that firms presenting higher performance in terms of ROA and sales and higher leverage levels that enhance their liquidity as well are healthier in terms of Z-score than their less profitable counterparts and acquire lower rates of probability of default: in other words, less risk. The results of the study can lead to policy implications for both Managers and the Government in order to enhance the growth of Greek manufacturing sector.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Derrick Kanngiesser ◽  
Reiner Martin ◽  
Laurent Maurin ◽  
Diego Moccero

Abstract While the global financial crisis revealed a need for macroprudential policy tools to mitigate the build-up of risk in the financial system, the impact of such policies on the banking sector and the macroeconomy remains largely uncertain. We contribute to the empirical literature that estimates the impact of shocks to bank capital buffers on bank lending and the macroeconomy by estimating a Bayesian VAR model identified with sign restrictions. We use bank-level data for large euro area listed banks to construct an aggregate bank capital buffer for the euro area, which is included as another variable in the model. We estimate three shocks affecting the euro area economy, namely a demand shock, a monetary policy shock and a shock to bank capital buffers. We find that banks curtail lending and reduce their relative exposure to riskier assets in response to a shock to the bank capital buffer. Historical shock decomposition analysis shows that shocks to bank capital buffers have contributed to impair bank lending growth and to widen bank lending spreads, hence depressing economic activity.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peiyi Yu ◽  
Jessica Hong Yang ◽  
Nada Kakabadse

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.


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