Uniqueness of Competitive Equilibrium Price in Linear Exchange Economies: A Note

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Somdeb Lahiri
1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. O'Brien

In this paper the empirical validity of the binary lottery preference inducing technique is tested in a real world market institution. In each market the potential gains to exchange arise from induced risk preferences, and the predicted competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the Pareto optimal risk sharing allocation. Price convergence to (and near) the competitive equilibrium price was rapid in each market, and most trades were individually rational with respect to induced certainty equivalents. This evidence implies that preferences can be induced in an oral double auction institution, using this technique.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Ottaviani ◽  
Peter Norman Sørensen

This paper analyzes how asset prices in a binary market react to information when traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs. We show that the competitive equilibrium price underreacts to information when there is a bound to the amount of money traders are allowed to invest. Underreaction is more pronounced when prior beliefs are more heterogeneous. Even in the absence of exogenous bounds on the amount that traders can invest, prices underreact to information provided that traders become less risk averse as their wealth increases. In a dynamic setting, underreaction results in initial momentum and then reversal in the long run. (JEL D83, D84, G11, G12, G14)


2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Marc Bonnisseau ◽  
Michael Florig

2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 253-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monique Florenzano ◽  
Emma Moreno-García

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